Virginia\u27s Equitable Distribution
Law: An Owner\u27s Manual by Turner, Brett R.
Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 46 | Issue 4 Article 4
Fall 9-1-1989
Virginia's Equitable Distribution Law: An Owner's
Manual
Brett R. Turner
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Family Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington & Lee University School of Law
Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law Review by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University
School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brett R. Turner, Virginia's Equitable Distribution Law: An Owner's Manual, 46 Wash. & Lee L. Rev.
807 (1989), https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol46/iss4/4




Virginia's equitable distribution statute, section 20-107.3 of the Anno-
tated Code of Virginia,' has been in effect for more than five years.
Although Virginia courts have had multiple opportunities to explain and
interpret the new statute, an amazing number of questions remain to be
answered. Judge Coleman of the Virginia Court of Appeals recently noted:
Equitable distribution in divorce cases in Virginia is a recent
creature of statute. Judicial construction of the statute is in its
infancy. The many questions concerning the scope, intention and
application of the statute are now only beginning to be answered.
2
This article has been written for two separate and somewhat conflicting
purposes. First, in the five years since the statute was enacted, courts have
resolved some of the statute's key ambiguities. This resolving process
unquestionably has been healthy and necessary, but it has made a full
understanding of the case law essential to understanding the statute. More-
over, because courts consider questions only as they arise, the newly
important case law inevitably is fragmented and disorganized. This article
will attempt to remedy the recent fragmentation of Virginia's equitable
distribution law by comprehensively outlining and restating both the statute
and the case law.
Second, now that the main elements of Virginia's equitable distribution
law have been established, the time is ripe to consider whether the law is
accomplishing successfully its purpose. Section 20-107.3 was enacted to
remedy "the inequity inherent under the common law scheme" for dividing
property upon divorce.3 Yet commentators in other states have questioned
whether equitable distribution is truly any fairer to dependent spouses than
* Brett R. Turner is a Senior Attorney with the National Legal Research Group in
Charlottesville, Virginia, specializing in the field of family law. He acquired his J.D. degree
from the University of North Carolina in 1984, is an associate editor of the Equitable
Distribution Journal, and has written the 1987, 1988, and 1989 supplements to L. GOLDEN,
EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY (1983). Mr. Turner would like to thank Stephen R.
Hart and Edward B. Gerber for giving him time to write this article. In addition, significant
intangible contributions to the substance of this article were made by David B. Jackson, A.
Brakke Campfield, and Prescott L. Prince.
I. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3 (Supp. 1989).
2. Booth v. Booth, 7 Va. App. 22, 85, 371 S.E.2d 569, 571 (1988).
3. REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTE STUDYING SECTION 20-107 OF THE CODE OF Vmn4A
TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF VIRGINIA, VA. H. Doc. No. 21, at 4 (1982).
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the prior common law system. 4 A critical examination of Virginia's expe-
rience in comparison with the experience of other states with similar statutes
will provide useful suggestions as to how Virginia's equitable distribution
law can be refined and improved.
II. PROCEDURE
The Virginia statute, as originally enacted, contained few provisions
regarding basic equitable distribution procedures. Not surprisingly, there-
fore, a disproportionate number of reported cases and statutory amendments
have dealt with procedural issues.
A. Types of Actions
1. Initial Actions
The Virginia statute allows equitable distribution claims to be raised in
two different types of actions. Claims are made most often in initial actions
in which no court previously has made any decree relating to any part of
the parties' marriage or divorce. The Virginia statute expressly allows a
claim for equitable distribution to be made in the most common initial
proceedings-actions for divorce and dissolution.-
The Virginia courts have not yet considered whether equitable distri-
bution is available in actions to annul a marriage. 6 Section 20-107.3 expressly
refers only to actions for divorce or dissolution. But one can easily imagine
situations in which it would be unjust not to allow equitable distribution
in annulment actions. For instance, assume that an already married man
marries a second wife, telling her that he never has been married. The two
live together for many years and accumulate significant amounts of marital
property. Then the husband reveals his prior marriage and evicts his second
wife from the marital home. Do courts truly have no power to act in such
a situation? Under a literal interpretation of section 20-107.3, courts are
4. See infra note 355 and accompanying text.
5. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(A) (Supp. 1989).
6. But cf. Pretlow v. Pretlow, 177 Va. 524, 14 S.E.2d 381 (1971) (holding that where
marriage annulled for fraud, trial court acted properly by returning to husband gifts made to
wife in contemplation of marriage; also proper to award wife temporary alimony). The issue
has not arisen in other states, perhaps because many equitable distribution statutes expressly
apply to annulment as well as divorce. L. GOLDEN, EQUITABLE DISTmIUnTON OF PROPERTY §
5.10 (1983 & Supp. 1989). Two states that have adopted equitable distribution by court
decision, however, have applied it to annulment as well as divorce. See White v. White, 283
S.C. 348, 323 S.E.2d 521 (1984); LaRue v. LaRue, 304 S.E.2d 312 (W. Va. 1983). Courts and
legislatures in other states, therefore, seem to favor allowing equitable distribution upon
annulment.
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helpless. A court, however, might be strongly tempted in such a situation
to read the statute more expansively.
7
Equitable distribution is probably not available in actions for divorce
from bed and board. Although courts have not considered the issue, section
20-107.3 on its face applies only to actions for divorce from matrimony.
Moreover, the legislature used almost identical language in sections 20-107.1
and 20-107.2, 8 except that it added a specific reference to divorces from
bed and board. In light of this apparently deliberate omission of divorces
from bed and board from section 20.107.3, courts probably will refuse to
allow equitable distribution in actions for divorce from bed and board. An
equitable distribution claim also cannot be made in a partition proceeding.9
2. Subsequent Actions
Equitable distribution obviously is not available if the parties already
have been divorced in Virginia. A party gets only one bite at the apple,
and if he misses the chance or finds the apple sour, he has no legal remedy. 0
A different situation exists when the parties are divorced in another
state. Because a court can divide property located outside its own state only
if it has personal jurisdiction over the owner," it is important that Virginia
be able to divide property over which another state's courts lacked juris-
diction. Section 20-107.3 was amended in 1985 expressly to allow equitable
distribution within two years after a Virginia domiciliary is divorced by a
court that lacks personal jurisdiction over him.' 2 No Virginia
7. Alternatively, the doctrines of estoppel and unclean hands might provide a basis for
relief. But what if, rather than deliberately misleading the wife, the husband instead had a
good faith mistaken belief that his first wife was dead or that she had divorced him? Where
neither party is to blame for a void or voidable marriage, there would seem to be no public
policy obstacle to allowing an equitable distribution. The best solution, of course, would be
a statutory amendment directly stating whether § 20-107.3 applies to annulments.
8. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20.107.1, 20-107.2 (Supp. 1989).
9. Thurman v. Thurman, No. 0003-85 (Va. Ct. App. Aug. 29, 1985).
10. See Parra v. Parra, 1 Va. App. 118, 336 S.E.2d 157 (1985). Similarly, a monetary
award cannot be modified after it has been made. Court orders can be modified only if there
is either express statutory authority to modify or if the court reserves jurisdiction to modify
in its initial order. See, e.g., Brinn v. Brinn, 147 Va. 277, 137 S.E. 503 (1927). Modification
is not permitted by any Virginia statute, and a statutory requirement that equitable distribution
be done "upon" divorce prevents the court from reserving jurisdiction to decide the case at
any time after the divorce decree is rendered. Parra, 336 S.E.2d at 157.
11. See infra notes 14-24 and accompanying text.
12. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(A) (Supp. 1989) was amended by 1985 Va. Acts 442 to
provide that equitable distribution is available "upon the filing with the court ... of a
certified copy of a final divorce decree obtained without the Commonwealth." The same act
added VA. CODE .A . § 20-107.3(I) (Supp. 1989), which provides:
A court of proper jurisdiction under § 20-96 may exercise the powers conferred
by this section after a court of a foreign jurisdiction has decreed a dissolution of a
marriage or a divorce from the bond of matrimony, if (i) one of the parties was
domiciled in this Commonwealth when the foreign divorce proceedings were com-
menced, and (ii) the foreign court did not have personal jurisdiction over the party
1989]
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case has construed the new language.' 3
B. Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction in divorce cases is governed by the familiar rule of "divisible
divorce." The divorce itself can be granted by any state in which either
spouse is domiciled,14 but in order to decide support and property issues,
the court must have either in personam jurisdiction over both spouses or
in rem jurisdiction over the marital assets.' 5
Three requirements must be met before personal jurisdiction exists.
First, personal jurisdiction must be proper under Virginia's long-arm stat-
domiciled in the Commonwealth, and (iii) the proceeding is initiated within two
years of receipt of notice of the foreign decree by the party domiciled in the
Commonwealth, and (iv) the court obtains personal jurisdiction over the parties
pursuant to § 8.01-328.1 (A) (9), or in any other manner permitted by law.
13. The court of appeals, however, has considered a related alimony case. In Gibson v.
Gibson, 5 Va. App. 426, 364 S.E.2d 518 (1988), the parties resided in Virginia until the
husband left the marital home and moved to Tennessee. He filed an action for divorce in that
state, and the court issued a divorce decree that also resolved support issues. Unfortunately,
however, the court did so without giving the wife proper notice, and upon the wife's motions,
the court vacated the property division for lack of notice. The wife's pending Virginia divorce
action then came up for trial, and the Virginia trial court awarded the wife alimony. On
appeal, the Virginia Court of Appeals noted that the Tennessee decision re-opening the
Tennessee decree was in effect a holding that Tennessee had not met the requirements for
personal jurisdiction over the wife at the time of the initial Tennessee decree. Because only a
court with personal jurisdiction over both parties can make a binding decision on alimony,
see Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416 (1957), the court found that the re-opened Tennessee
decree was not entitled to full faith and credit in Virginia on the question of alimony. While
Gibson considered only whether the Virginia trial court could make an alimony award, the
court recognized that Vanderbilt applies to all "[p]ersonal rights, which include property and
support rights." Gibson, 364 S.E.2d at 519. Thus, if the Virginia trial court had made an
equitable distribution award, the court of appeals probably would have affirmed the award
on the same basis that the court of appeals affirmed the alimony award.
Even after Gibson, attorneys still should exercise caution when responding to out-of-state
divorce proceedings. The Supreme Court has held that where the question of jurisdiction is
actually litigated, full faith and credit attaches to other states' findings on jurisdiction as well
as to findings on the merits. Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948); Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S.
378 (1948). Thus, if the client contests jurisdiction in the foreign state and loses, the foreign
court's finding that it has jurisdiction is binding in Virginia. Accordingly, when sued for
divorce in another state, a Virginia resident must either (1) litigate jurisdiction before a foreign
court that may well be biased in favor of the plaintiff, or (2) take a default judgment and
run the risk that the Virginia courts will decide that the other state really did have jurisdiction.
This is probably one of the least attractive decisions family practitioners must help their clients
make.
14. Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945); Evans v. Asphalt Roads & Material
Co., 194 Va. 165, 72 S.E.2d 321 (1952).
15. Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416 (1957); Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948);
Krieger v. Krieger, 334 U.S. 555 (1948); Gibson v. Gibson, 5 Va. App. 426, 364 S.E.2d 518
(1988). Jurisdiction over child custody cases once followed the same rule, but it is now governed
by a nationwide uniform statutory standard. See Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, 28
U.S.C. § 1738A (1982 & Supp. 1986); Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, VA. CODE
ANN . §§ 20-125 to 20-146 (1983).
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ute. 16 Second, the defendant must have constitutionally sufficient minimum
contacts with Virginia. 17 Where the divorce action arises from the defendant's
contacts with Virginia, 8 those contacts need reveal only that the defendant
deliberately took advantage of the laws or economy of Virginia. 9 The
contacts must be purposeful, and the contacts cannot result from the
unilateral action of the other spouse.20 Moreover, while the foreseeability
of being sued in Virginia is certainly one relevant factor, foreseeability alone
is not a "sufficient benchmark" of contact with the forum. 21 Where the
divorce action does not arise from the defendant's contacts with Virginia,
only continuous and systematic general business contacts will be sufficient.
This difficult jurisdictional standard rarely is met in divorce cases. Third,
the exercise of jurisdiction by the Virginia courts must be fair and reasonable
under the facts of a specific case.? Where the defendant has sufficient
contacts with the forum state, it will be a "rare case" in which this third
test is not met.?
Virginia never has considered whether in rem jurisdiction is available
in divorce cases, but in rem jurisdiction is available in other states.- A
court has in rem jurisdiction to divide any property physically located within
the forum state's borders, regardless of whether it has personal jurisdiction
16. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). The Virginia long-arm
statute is codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-328.1 (Supp. 1989). The statute specifically
provides for jurisdiction when Virginia was the last matrimonial domicile if one party to the
marriage still resides in Virginia. Id. § 8.01-329.1(A)(9).
17. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 310. Note, however, that a much stricter test applies
to jurisdiction for the purpose of dividing military retirement pay. See infra notes 63-64 and
accompanying text.
18. It also may be sufficient if the defendant's contacts are merely "related to" the
cause of action. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415
n.10 (1984) (raising but not answering question); cf. id. at 419, 427-28 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(arguing that "arising from" test should be applied where cause of action is only "related
to" defendant's contacts).
19. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980). The most common
situation in which a divorce action arises from the defendant's contacts is when the last marital
domicile was in the forum state. Courts almost uniformly have upheld jurisdiction in the last
marital domicile, even where one spouse has been absent for some time. See e.g., King v.
King, 513 A.2d 773 (Del. Fain. Ct. 1985); Robinson v. Robinson, 56 N.C. App. 737, 289
S.E.2d 612 (1982). Detailed discussion of minimum contacts in divorce cases lies outside the
scope of this article. For an examination of minimum contacts in equitable distribution cases
nationwide, see Turner, Jurisdiction and Equitable Distribution, 4 EQuTABLE DIsTRiBuTiON
JouNAL 205 (1987).
20. Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
21. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
22. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
23. Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
24. Id. at 116 (Brennan, J., concurring).
25. See, e.g., In re Breen, 560 S.W.2d 358 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977); McCasland v.McCasland,
68 N.Y.2d 748, 497 N.E.2d 696 (1986); cf. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-328.1(A)(6) (Supp. 1989)
(long-arm provision permitting personal jurisdiction over defendants "[h]aving an interest in,
using, or possessing real property in this Commonwealth").
19891
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over the owner.26 In effect, the ownership of property in Virginia is a
limited form of minimum contact with this state.
27
C. Bifurcation
A "bifurcated" divorce trial is one in which the court divorces the
parties some time before the court considers questions of support and
property division. Given the complexity of equitable distribution cases and
the need to value all of the marital assets, bifurcation has obvious practical
advantages. There has been some uncertainty, however, as to whether
bifurcation is permitted by Virginia law.
The matter first arose in Parra v. Parra.21 Neither party in Parra
actually argued the issue, but the court considered on its own motion
whether or not Virginia trial courts have subject matter jurisdiction to
consider equitable distribution some time after the parties actually have
been divorced. The court first rejected the notion that the statutory authority
to consider equitable distribution "upon decreeing the dissolution of a
marriage" required that equitable distribution be considered at the same
time as divorce. 29 Instead, the court interpreted this language as establishing
only the earliest date on which a monetary award can be made. 0 Because
the statute neither prohibited nor permitted consideration of equitable
distribution after the date of divorce, the question then became whether the
divorce decree could reserve jurisdiction to consider equitable distribution
at a later date. The court concluded that unless a statute specifies otherwise,
a trial court has the inherent equitable power to defer exercise of its own
jurisdiction. 31 The trial court's decree in Parra, therefore, was not void for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Parra was a logical and definitive opinion, and it should have been the
last word on bifurcation in Virginia. Unfortunately, however, the legislature
felt a need to codify the Parra rule, and its well-meaning attempt to do so
created more problems than it solved. The new statute provides:
The court, on motion of both parties, may retain jurisdiction in
the final decree of divorce to adjudicate the remedy provided by
26. In re Breen, 560 S.W.2d 358, 363 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977). The Virginia courts, of
course, do not actually divide property upon divorce, so the argument against in rem jurisdiction
is somewhat stronger in Virginia. The precise legal questions are: 1) whether there is a sufficient
nexus between ownership of property and the monetary award that mere ownership should
create jurisdiction for the limited purpose of basing an award on the owned asset, and 2)
whether the monetary award is a "claim to property" for purposes of triggering the state's
interest in regulating ownership of property within its borders. See generally Shaffer v. Heitner,
433 U.S. 186, 207-08 (1977); Breen, 560 S.W.2d at 363. This author's guess is that in rem
jurisdiction would apply, but the question has not arisen in either of the two "monetary
award" equitable distribution states (Virginia and Maryland).
27. See Breen, 560 S.W.2d at 363.
28. 1 Va. App. 118, 336 S.E.2d 157 (1985).
29. VA. CODE ANN. § 20.107.3(A) (Supp. 1989) (emphasis added).
30. Parra v. Parra, 1 Va. App. 118, 336 S.E.2d 157, 161 (1988).
31. Id. at 161-62.
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this section when the court determines that such action is clearly
necessary because of the complexities of the parties' property inter-
ests, and all decrees heretofore entered retaining such jurisdiction
are validated.
3 2
The statute essentially codifies the Parra rule and adds an additional
provision that bifurcation be done only where "clearly necessary." This
much of the statutory language is unobjectionable.
By expressly authorizing bifurcation only "on motion of both parties,"
however, the legislature opened a Pandora's Box of difficult problems. The
statute is phrased in the positive by stating only the conditions under which
a court can bifurcate a divorce trial. Because the appellate courts have not
interpreted the new statute, we do not know what will happen when a court
purports to bifurcate a divorce case on the motion of one party alone. The
Parra court held that trial courts have inherent equitable authority to defer
exercise of their own jurisdiction, but the court also noted that "there is
nothing in the statute to prevent courts from using their inherent powers
in equity."" a The new statute also contains no express restriction on inherent
powers, but the mutual consent and "clearly necessary" requirements es-
sentially are superfluous if they do not restrict those powers. Thus, it
appears that the trial court has authority to bifurcate only where both
parties join in the motion. If the court bifurcates a trial on the motion of
one party only, the court has exceeded its authority, and all actions more
than twenty-one days after the divorce decree are void for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.3 4 The bottom line is that the dependent spouse loses her
right to an equitable distribution if the court improperly bifurcates a divorce
case.
Dismissal is an unreasonably harsh sanction for violating the technical
conditions under which bifurcation is permitted. The modern trend is to
dismiss an action for procedural violation only where the violation causes
real and irreparable prejudice to an innocent party. 5 Improper bifurcation
may be an inconvenience for the nonconsenting party, but in most cases
bifurcation will not create prejudice. Whatever prejudice does exist generally
can be removed by lesser sanctions such as continuances and orders to pay
costs. 6 Moreover, where a trial court which is ignorant of the consent
32. VA CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(A) (Supp. 1989).
33. Parra, 336 S.E.2d at 161-62.
34. See VA. Sup. CT. R. 1:1 (trial court cannot modify own orders more than 21 days
after orders are issued).
35. See, e.g., 23 AM. JuR. 2D Depositions & Discovery § 385 (1983) (stating that dismissal
of action is sanction of last resort, applicable only in extreme circumstances to most flagrant
of discovery abuses); id. § 358 (noting courts' reluctance to dismiss client's action because of
attorney's negligence).
36. See, e.g., First Charter Land Corp. v. Middle Atlantic Dredging, Inc., 218 Va. 304,
237 S.E.2d 145 (1977) (holding that where plaintiff surprised defendant by introducing
unexpected exhibit at trial and failure to notify was inadvertent error causing no irremedial
prejudice, trial court properly offered defendant continuance rather than ruling exhibit inad-
missible).
19891
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requirement improperly bifurcates a divorce case, there is no innocent party
because the nonconsenting party is substantially at fault for failing to bring
the requirement to the court's attention. Improper bifurcation, therefore,
meets none of the generally accepted conditions under which a cause of
action can be dismissed for procedural error. The legislature should amend
section 20-107.3 to provide for more reasonable sanctions when the court
improperly bifurcates a divorce trial.
D. Burdens of Proof and Presumptions
Under the Virginia statute, property acquired after marriage and before
the last separation of the parties is presumed to be marital property.37 The
presumption can be rebutted through introduction of "satisfactory evidence"
that the property is separate.
38
Interestingly, the marital property presumption does not apply to all
property that could be classified as marital. Because marital property
includes all property acquired "during the marriage" 39 and the marriage
does not end until the date of divorce, property acquired between the last
separation and the date of divorce could be classified as marital property? °
Property acquired between the last separation and the date of divorce,
however, would not be subject to the marital property presumption, which
applies only to property acquired before the final separation.
4 '
The burden of proof as to the value of property lies upon the party
seeking to have the court consider a particular asset in making the monetary
award. 42 If the court lacks sufficient evidence to determine the value of a
particular piece of property, the court will ignore that property for monetary
award purposes.43 Finally, once property is classified as marital, the property
is presumed to be jointly owned and, therefore, subject to actual division
unless there is clear evidence that it is not owned jointly."
37. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(A)(2) (Supp. 1989). A separation is the "last separation"
if one or both parties intend at the time of separation or at some later time that the separation
be permanent. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. § 20-107.3(A)(2)(ii).
40. Classification of such property as marital, although possible, is highly unlikely.
Ordinarily, the date of classification will be the date of the last separation, and the presumption
will apply to all property. See Price v. Price, 4 Va. App. 224, 355 S.E.2d 905, 908 (1987).
The court, however, has discretion to classify property as of a later date. Price, 355 S.E.2d
at 909. Questions relating to the date of classification are discussed in greater detail infra
notes 116-126 and accompanying text.
41. Price, 355 S.E.2d at 909.
42. Mitchell v. Mitchell, 4 Va. App. 113, 355 S.E.2d 18 (1987); Bowers v. Bowers, 4
Va. App. 610, 359 S.E.2d 546 (1987). For example, in Bowers, the wife failed to introduce a
credible valuation of the husband's pension plan. Accordingly, the court of appeals affirmed
the trial court's refusal to consider the practice in setting the monetary award.
43. Bowers, 359 S.E.2d at 552.
44. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(A)(2) (Supp. 1989). See also infra note 315 and accom-
panying text.
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III. CLASSIFICATION
Equitable distribution of property in Virginia consists of three separate
steps: classification of property, valuation of property, and the setting of
the monetary award.4 5 The trial court commits reversible error if it fails to
complete any of these three steps.
46
In classifying marital property, the court first must look to federal law.
While federal law does not provide any substantive authority for dividing
types of property, it does make certain benefits immune from division by
state courts. 47
If an interest is not immune from division under federal law, the
question then becomes whether that interest constitutes marital property
under Virginia state law. Virginia courts have not expressly subdivided the
classification step in any way. Nevertheless, the statutory rules for classifi-
cation break down logically into a series of lesser steps. Section 20-107.3(A)(2)
provides:
Marital property is (i) all property titled in the names of both
parties ... and (ii) all other property acquired by each party during
the marriage which is not separate property as defined above.
4
The clear language of this section establishes several different requirements
that an interest must meet before being classified as "marital property."
First, the interest must qualify as "property." Second, the interest must
have been acquired by one or both parties. Third, the interest must be titled
jointly. Finally, if it is not titled jointly, the interest must have been acquired
during the marriage and fall outside the express statutory definition of
separate property.
While Virginia case law has not incorporated a step-by-step classification
approach such as this one, the rules for classification are much easier to
understand if specific steps can be isolated, described, and applied. This
article, therefore, will address classification of property by focusing upon
the one federal law and five state law classification steps outlined above.
A. Step 1: Federal Preemption
Federal law currently affects equitable distribution only when federal
retirement or disability benefits are at issue. Certain types of these benefits
may as a matter of federal law be exempt from state laws regarding property
division upon divorce.
45. Kaufman v. Kaufman, 7 Va. App. 488, 375 S.E.2d 374 (1988). See Brown v. Brown,
5 Va. App. 238, 361 S.E.2d 364 (1987) ("the factors bearing on the amount and method of
payment of a monetary award ... are only to be applied after the assets of the parties are
classified and evaluated"); Rexrode v. Rexrode, 1 Va. App. 385, 339 S.E.2d 544 (1986).
46. Brown, 361 S.E.2d at 364; Rexrode, 339 S.E.2d at 544.
47. See infra notes 49-69 and accompanying text.
48. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(A)(2) (Supp. 1989).
1989]
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The divisibility of military retirement pay is among the most complicated
issues in family law. Before 1981 state decisions were split on whether such
pay could be divided by state courts.49 The Supreme Court resolved this
conflict in McCarty v. McCarty °5 0 holding that military retirement pay could
not as a matter of law be divided equitably by state courts. McCarty was
among the least popular Supreme Court decisions of modern times, and
Congress overruled it retroactively in 1983 by enacting the Uniformed
Services Former Spouses Protection Act (USFSPA).
5
1
The USFSPA gives state courts authority to divide military "retired or
retainer pay."52 "Retired or retainer pay" clearly includes military retirement
pay, 3 and Virginia has held that there is no federal obstacle to dividing
such pay.5 4 The USFSPA is silent concerning whether state courts can divide
benefits other than "retired or retainer pay." In Mansell v. Mansell,
55
however, the Supreme Court recently held that state courts cannot divide
veterans' disability pay. Because veterans' disability pay is one of the benefits
outside the scope of "retired or retainer pay," ' 56 state courts probably now
can divide only benefits that are divisible under the USFSPA. In other
words, when dividing compensation for military service, preemption appar-
ently is the rule, and divisibility the exception.5 7 This general rule of
49. Compare Russell v. Russell, 605 S.W.2d 33 (Ky.) (preemption), cert. denied, 453
U.S. 922 (1980) with In re Fithian, 10 Cal. 3d 592, 517 P.2d 449 (no preemption), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 825 (1984).
50. 453 U.S. 210 (1981).
51. 10 U.S.C. § 1408 (1988).
52. Id. § 1408(c)(1) (1988).
53. Id. § 1408(a)(4) (1988).
54. Sawyer v. Sawyer, I Va. App. 75, 335 S.E.2d 277 (1985). Accord Holmes v. Holmes,
7 Va. App. 472, 375 S.E.2d 387 (1988). Sawyer is discussed in detail infra notes 70-73 and
accompanying text.
55. 109 S. Ct. 2023 (1989). Interestingly, Mansell was a collateral attack upon a 1979
divorce decree incorporating a separation agreement providing that the benefits were divisible.
In finding preemption, the Supreme Court noted that California courts had held under
California state law that the judgment could be re-opened if preemption existed. Id. at 2027
n.5. The Supreme Court might well have reached a different result if the judgment had not
been subject to re-opening under the applicable state law.
Also, Mansell held only that veterans' disability pay could not be divided under equitable
distribution or community property principles. Upon remand, the California courts still might
be able to hold the benefits divisible, not under community property law, but under the normal
law of contracts. This possibility finds support in the Supreme Court's refusal to consider
whether the contractual provision against assignment of veterans' benefits applied to the case.
Id. at 2027 n.6.
56. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(1) (1988). There are several major types of benefits which fall
outside the definition of "retired or retainer pay." The most significant of these are military
disability pay and veterans' disability pay. In addition, "retired or retainer pay" incorporates
certain deductions from the military spouse's base retired pay, see id. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(a)(4)(A-
F), and the amount of these deductions-in other words, the excess of gross retired pay over
net retired pay-also falls outside the definition.
57. Before Mansell, state courts disagreed on whether they could divide benefits other
than "retired or retainer pay." For cases permitting division, see, e.g., Casas v. Thompson,
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preemption almost certainly applies in Virginia, even if the court makes a
monetary award rather than dividing the pension outright.
58
The USFSPA itself contains a number of ambiguous provisions. A
provision establishing a minimum marriage length of ten years has been
interpreted unanimously to apply only when the non-owning spouse seeks
direct payment from the military59 and not when the non-owning spouse
seeks indirect payments from her ex-spouse. 60 A provision limiting the former
spouse's award to fifty percent of the pension 6 likewise applies only to
42 Cal. 3d 131, 720 P.2d 921 (1986) (excess of gross retired pay over net retired pay); Campbell
v. Campbell, 474 So. 2d 1339 (La. Ct. App. 1984), appeal denied, 478 So. 2d 148 (La. 1985)
(veterans' disability pay); Austin v. Austin, 103 N.M. 457, 709 P.2d 179 (1985) (military
disability pay). For cases finding preemption, see, e.g., King v. King, 149 Mich. App. 495,
386 N.W.2d 562 (1986) (military disability pay); Conroy v. Conroy, 706 S.W.2d 745 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1986) (veterans' disability pay).
The cases dividing benefits other than veterans' disability pay are technically speaking still
good law. Nevertheless, it would be difficult to argue after Mansell that the USFSPA provides
an exclusive list of the benefits that are divisible. In practical effect, therefore, Mansell has
overruled all of the state cases holding that state courts can divide benefits not expressly made
divisible by the USFSPA.
58. The Virginia Court of Appeals suggested that preemption might not apply in Brinkley
v. Brinkley, 5 Va. App. 132, 361 S.E.2d 139 (1987). The husband in Brinkley owned a
veterans' disability pension, one of the several types of benefits that do not constitute "retired
or retainer pay" under the USFSPA. The court ultimately remanded the case for more factual
findings as to the nature and source of the disability pension. Brinkley, 361 S.E.2d at 143.
The court, however, noted that because Virginia courts issue monetary awards rather than
changing legal title to property, the cases finding federal preemption to exist "may be
distinguishable." Id. In other words, even if federal law prohibits division of military benefits
other than "retired or retainer pay," the court suggested that federal law might not prohibit
a Virginia court from making a monetary award based on those benefits. Id.
Analogous law from other states, however, indicates that the Brinkley court's suggestion
is probably erroneous. Although the question has not arisen in Maryland, the only other
"monetary award" state, Maryland did hold (before the USFSPA's enactment) that McCarty
prevented division of military retirement pay even under a "monetary award" statute. Hill v.
Hill, 291 Md. 615, 436 A.2d 67 (1981). Moreover, McCarty itself held that federal law
prevented not only an actual division of military retirement benefits, but also an award of
offsetting property to compensate the non-owning spouse for the nondivisibility of the pension.
McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 228-29 n.22 (1981). Accord In re Smith, 33 Wash. App.
147, 652 P.2d 391 (1982) (error to award wife property equal to husband's military retirement
pay while dividing rest of property equally). Thus, although most courts held that McCarty
did not prevent state courts from considering the pension in setting the size of the property
award, see L. GOLDEN, supra note 6, § 6.05, there was general agreement that McCarty could
not be avoided simply by awarding property of equal value in place of the pension itself.
Because Virginia's monetary award system makes precisely such a substitution, a monetary
award probably constitutes an improper direct offset if it is based upon a pension immune
from distribution under federal law.
59. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(e)(1) (1988).
60. See, e.g., Stone v. Stone, 725 S.W.2d 145 (Mo. 1987); Konzen v. Konzen, 103 Wash.
2d 470, 693 P.2d 97 (1985); see also Anderson v. Anderson, 13 Ohio App. 3d 194, 468 N.E.2d
784 (1984) (holding that where same two parties were married, divorced, remarried, and then
divorced again, two marriages could be added together for purposes of ten-year rule).
61. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(e)(1) (1988).
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direct payments from the government. 62 The act allows pensions to be
divided only by a state in which the military spouse was a resident or
domiciled or to whose jurisdiction the military spouse has consented. 63 This
restrictive jurisdictional test, moreover, clearly applies to all types of ben-
efits.64
An additional thorny issue centers around divorce decrees issued during
the brief period between June 1981 and January 1983 when McCarty still
applied to military retirement pay. Because McCarty was overruled retro-
actively to the date it was decided, some states have permitted decrees issued
in this "McCarty gap" period to be re-opened for division of a military
pension.65 These decisions, however, often have relied upon a provision
similar to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6), allowing divorce decrees
to be re-opened for general equitable reasons. Those states that, like
Virginia, have no such provision, generally have refused to re-open McCarty
gap decrees. 6
Federal non-military retirement benefits also generally are subject to
division. Often, a federal statute authorizes states to divide these benefits
under state law subject to certain conditions. 67 Finally, after some initial
uncertainty, it is now clear that private pensions regulated under the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) are subject to division.6 8
The order dividing the pension much meet the technical requirements for a
"qualified domestic relations order" (QDRO). 69
B. Step 2: "Property"
The need for an interest to qualify as "property" was recognized by
the Virginia courts early in the statute's history. In Sawyer v. Sawyer 0 the
issue was whether military retirement benefits constituted marital property.
The court began its opinion by stating: "We must first decide if a military
retirement pension is 'personal property' as contemplated by section 20-
107.3." 71 Thus, the court recognized that an interest cannot be classified as
marital property unless an interest first constitutes property.
62. See Deliduka v. Deliduka, 347 N.W.2d 52 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984); Butcher v.
Butcher, 357 S.E.2d 226 (W. Va. 1987).
63. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(4) (1988).
64. See Southern v. Glenn, 677 S.W.2d 576 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984); cf. Gowins v. Gowins,
466 So. 2d 32 (La. 1985) (noting that jurisdiction to enforce award of military pension exists
as long as court had jurisdiction at time court made original award).
65. See, e.g., Holler v. Holler, 257 Ga. 27, 354 S.E.2d 140 (1987); In re Habermehl,
135 Ill. App. 3d 305, 481 N.E.2d 782 (1985); In re Quintard, 691 S.W.2d 950 (Mo. Ct. App.
1985). See generally L. GOLDEN, supra note 6, § 6.06.
66. See supra note 65.
67. See 5 U.S.C. § 8345()(1) (1982) (allowing division of civil service retirement benefits);
22 U.S.C. § 4054 (allowing division of foreign service retirement benefits) (Supp. V 1987).
68. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(A) (1982).
69. Id. § 1056(d)(3)(B-E) (1982).
70. 1 Va. App. 75, 355 S.E.2d 277 (1985).
71. Sawyer v. Sawyer, I Va. App. 75, 355 S.E.2d 277, 279 (1985).
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The Sawyer court, however, did not proceed to define "property"
comprehensively or even to consider whether a pension possesses the char-
acteristics ordinarily ascribed to property. Instead, the court looked at
whether or not the legislature intended that pensions be subject to division.
Although the court realized that "pensions do not have the normal attributes
of assets" such as tangible existence or transferability, the court viewed the
specific references to pensions in section 20-107.3 as evidence that the
legislature intended that pensions constitute property.7 2 The court refused
to construe "property" narrowly when such a construction would immunize
an asset that the legislature clearly intended to make subject to distribution.
73
Accordingly, the Sawyer court held that the definition of property was
broad enough to include military retirement pensions.
Sawyer is the only Virginia case to discuss the definition of property.
Sawyer, in many respects, was an easy case, for as the court recognized,
the legislature anticipated that pensions would be marital property.
Future cases where the legislative intent is unknown or ambiguous will
not be decided so easily. There are two alternate reasoning methods that
the court might employ in such a case. Sawyer defined property in a result-
oriented fashion: the court decided that divisibility of pensions was the
"right" result, and it chose a definition of property that allowed this result
to be reached. But in Sawyer, divisibility was "right" because it clearly had
been intended by the legislature. A future court might be hesitant to use
the same result-oriented reasoning process where the chosen result is "right"
only because the court believes it to be the wiser policy. Instead, the court
might use the method advocated by the husband in Sawyer and determine
whether the interest involved possesses the ordinary characteristics of prop-
erty. This second method would be more in keeping with Virginia courts'
traditional reluctance to emphasize policy views on questions of statutory
interpretation.
If the experience of other states is any guideline, Virginia courts soon
will have more opportunities to determine what constitutes property. The
most controversial issue involving the definition of property is the divisibility
of professional degrees and licenses. A large majority of states have held
that degrees and licenses are not "property" because they lack such tradi-
tional attributes of property as transferability.7 4 Moreover, while intangible
benefits such as pensions at least provide some assurance of future benefits,
a degree provides only the opportunity to obtain enhanced future benefits
through performance of future services. 75
72. Sawyer, 355 S.E.2d at 279-80.
73. Id. at 279.
74. See, e.g., Archer v. Archer, 303 Md. 347, 493 A.2d 1074 (1985); Hodge v. Hodge,
513 Pa. 264, 520 A.2d 15 (1986); Beeler v. Beeler, 715 S.W.2d 625 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986).
The leading case nationwide is In re Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75 (1978).
75. See, e.g., Sweeney v. Sweeney, 534 A.2d 1290 (Me. 1987); Mahoney v. Mahoney,
91 N.J. 488, 453 A.2d 527 (1982).
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New York, however, has reached a contrary result. In O'Brien v.
O'Brien7 6 the court reasoned that division of professional licenses was
"right" as a matter of public policy. The court then chose a definition of
property that permitted this result to be reached, holding that "property"
as used in the New York statute was broader than the technical meaning
of "property" at common law.
77
Although O'Brien uses almost exactly the same reasoning process as
Sawyer, it is unlikely that O'Brien would be followed in Virginia. The
Virginia statute neither supports nor prevents treatment of degrees or licenses
as property; it is entirely silent on the question. Thus, Virginia could go
against the overwhelming trend and treat degrees and licenses as property
only if (1) the court had a strong policy preference for divisibility, and (2)
the court decided to implement its own policy preference on a controversial
issue upon which the statute is silent. As noted above, Virginia courts
traditionally have been reluctant to follow the second requirement, and
there is little policy consensus favoring divisibility in any state outside of
New York. Instead, every state decision to consider the issue after O'Brien
has rejected the New York court's holding.78 The case in favor of divisibility
is simply not strong enough to overcome the strong trend against it and
the unwillingness of Virginia courts to reach controversial results without
legislative guidance.
The definition of property also has been involved in the ongoing dispute
over whether the goodwill of a business or professional practice is subject
to equitable distribution. Some courts, relying upon the traditional restrictive
definition of property, have held that goodwill is a mere expectancy of
future benefits rather than currently existing property.79 These courts also
have noted that because goodwill takes tangible form only as increased
future earnings, any attempt to divide goodwill, in effect, would divide
improperly those earnings. 0 Other courts, relying upon a more expansive
76. 66 N.Y.2d 576, 489 N.E.2d 712 (1985). New York is the only state that clearly has
held that degrees are property. Several Michigan Court of Appeals cases have reached the
same result, but other cases from the same court adopt the majority position. Compare
Woodworth v. Woodworth, 126 Mich. App. 258, 337 N.W.2d 332 (1983) (property) with Olah
v. Olah, 135 Mich. App. 404, 354 N.W.2d 359 (1984) (not property). The Michigan Supreme
Court has not resolved this split in authority.
77. O'Brien v. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d 576, 489 N.E.2d 712, 715. See generally L. GOLDEN,
supra note 6, § 6.19A (Supp. 1989).
78. See, e.g., In re Olar, 747 P.2d 676 (Colo. 1987) (reaffirming In re Graham, 574
P.2d 75 and expressly rejecting O'Brien); Sweeney v. Sweeney, 534 A.2d 1290 (Me. 1987);
Stevens v. Stevens, 23 Ohio St. 3d 115, 492 N.E.2d 131 (1986); Helm v. Helm, 289 S.C. 169,
345 S.E.2d 720 (1986). See generally L. GOLDEN, supra note 6, § 6.19 (Supp. 1989).
79. See, e.g., Beasley v. Beasley, 359 Pa. Super. 20, 518 A.2d 545 (1986).
80. See, e.g., Powell v. Powell, 231 Kan. 456, 648 P.2d 218 (1982); Holbrook v.
Holbrook, 103 Wis. 2d 327, 309 N.W.2d 343, 354 (1981) ("[t]he concept of professional
goodwill evanesces when one attempts to distinguish it from future earning capacity"). These
courts also have noted that goodwill is difficult to distinguish from professional reputation,
which cannot be divided because it does not constitute property. Holbrook, 309 N.W.2d at
54.
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definition of property and upon the unquestionable existence of goodwill
as an economic asset, have held that goodwill can be divided upon divorce.8 '
The decisions dividing goodwill appear to have the stronger argument.
The intangible asset called goodwill is merely an economist's way of saying
that certain future earnings will be caused not by future efforts, but by
present efforts in establishing such intangible benefits as a favorable repu-
tation or a good location. If these intangible benefits were acquired during
the marriage with marital funds, then some portion of the business' future
earnings will be caused by an investment of marital funds rather than the
performance of post-marital services. Virginia already has held in other
contexts that benefits received after the marriage as compensation for marital
efforts are marital property. Pension benefits earned during the marriage,
for instance, are marital property even if they are not received until many
years after divorce.82 Similarly, to the extent a business' future earnings are
caused by goodwill acquired during the marriage rather than by post-marital
services, the present value of those earnings should constitute marital
property under Virginia law.
A final major asset that may or may not be property is a claim for
personal injuries arising during the marriage but not yet litigated or settled
as of the date of classification. A minority of states have found such causes
of action too speculative to constitute property." Most states have noted
that while an outstanding claim may be hard to value, it is not more
speculative than assets such as contingent pensions which are" already divis-
ible.Y
Pensions, degrees, goodwill, and unliquidated personal injury claims
are the four major areas in which the definition of property has been at
issue. Additional benefits held to be property include remainder interests in
trusts, 8 uncollected judgments, 6 contingent fee contracts, 7 and consulting
contracts.8 Differing results have been reached as to stock options,89 ter-
81. See, e.g., In re Nichols, 43 Colo. App. 383, 606 P.2d 1314 (1979) (leading case);
Dugan v. Dugan, 92 N.J. 423, 457 A.2d 1 (1983); Taylor v. Taylor, 736 S.W.2d 388 (Mo.
1987); Poore v. Poore, 75 N.C. App. 414, 331 S.E.2d 266 (1985). This is probably the majority
position, although the recent trend has been to limit the conditions under which goodwill is
marital property. See, e.g., Taylor, 736 S.W.2d at 388.
82. See Sawyer v. Sawyer, 1 Va. App. 75, 335 S.E.2d 277 (1985).
83. See, e.g., Murphy v. Murphy, 510 N.E.2d 235 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987); Unkle v. Unkle,
305 Md. 587, 505 A.2d 849 (1986).
84. See, e.g., Richardson v. Richardson, 139 Wis. 2d 778, 407 N.W.2d 231 (1987). Even
if an unliquidated cause of action is property, it may be acquired in exchange for a form of
pre-marital "property"-the injured spouse's good health. See infra notes 173-78 and accom-
panying text.
85. Buxbaum v. Buxbaum, 214 Mont. 1, 692 P.2d 411 (1984); Loeb v. Loeb, 72 N.C.
App. 205, 324 S.E.2d 33 (1984) (remainder was property even though principal could not be
invaded).
86. Golleher v. Golleher, 697 S.W.2d 547 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
87. Garrett v. Garrett, 140 Ariz. 564, 683 P.2d 1166 (1983).
88. In re Vanderbeek, 177 Cal. App. 3d 224, 222 Cal. Rptr. 832 (1986) (primary purpose
of contract was to retire large debt husband owed to employer).
89. Compare Richardson v. Richardson, 280 Ark. 498, 659 S.W.2d 510 (1983) (property)
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mination benefits, 9° and choses in action.91 Additional benefits held not to
be property include patents, 92 job seniority, 93 and the right to engage in a
particular profession. 94
C. Step 3: "[A]cquired by each party"
The third classification step states the relatively obvious requirement
that marital property must be owned by the husband, the wife, or both
jointly. Property owned by third parties is neither marital nor separate
property, but something else altogether. 95 Accordingly, it cannot be consid-
ered in setting the monetary award.
Despite the self-evident nature of this step, there are two fact situations
in which it poses problems. First, as the parties begin to anticipate the
impending breakdown of the marriage, the spouse holding title to most of
the assets inevitably will be tempted to spend or convey away property he
anticipates losing in the property division. If a dishonest spouse has enough
foresight to finish his dissipation of assets before the date of classification,
he could claim that the assets are immune from equitable distribution
because the assets are owned by a third party.
The Virginia Court of Appeals is aware of this problem and has created
several possible remedies for it. In Booth v. Booth96 the wife lost $60,000
in a speculative stock market venture during the closing days of the marriage.
The wife argued that these funds could not be marital property because
they were spent before the date of classification. The court disagreed:
Normally, only property owned by the parties at the time of
the last separation is classified as marital property .... In the case
with In re Moody, 119 Ill. App. 3d 1043, 457 N.E.2d 1023 (1983) (holding that nontransferable
option not property where employee was unlikely to live long enough to exercise option). See
generally L. GOLDEN, supra note 6, § 5.06 (Supp. 1989).
90. One court has held that termination benefits constitute property if the employed
spouse loses his job and, therefore, acquires the right to receive the benefits before the date
of classification. Harrell v. Harrell, 120 A.D.2d 565, 502 N.Y.S.2d 57 (1986). Where the
owning spouse is still employed on the date of classification, however, other courts have held
that the potential future termination benefits are not property. Lawyer v. Lawyer, 288 Ark.
128, 702 S.W.2d 790 (1986); In Re Bishop, 46 Wash. App. 198, 729 P.2d 647 (1986).
91. Compare Moulton v. Moulton, 485 A.2d 976 (Me. 1984) (holding that money due
for services rendered is property) with Neffle v. Neffle, 483 N.E.2d 767 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983)
(holding that right to repossess home sold during marriage if buyer fails to make conditional
sale payments is not property).
92. Yannas v. Frondistou-Yannas, 395 Mass. 704, 481 N.E.2d 1153 (1985) (holding that
highly speculative patents on artificial skin are not property). A California court reached the
opposite result where the patent was susceptible to reasonably accurate valuation. In re Worth,
195 Cal. App. 3d 768, 241 Cal. Rptr. 135 (1987) (copyright on popular series of trivia books).
93. Boyd v. Boyd, 116 Mich. App. 774, 323 N.W.2d 553 (1982).
94. Ulmer v. Ulmer, 717 S.W.2d 665 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986).
95. No Virginia court has stated this rule. For supporting decisions from other states,
see, e.g., Addis v. Addis, 288 Ark. 205, 703 S.W.2d 852 (1986); Good v. Good, 458 So. 2d
83 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); In re Reich, 220 Mont. 192, 720 P.2d 286 (1986).
96. 7 Va. App. 22, 371 S.E.2d 569 (1988).
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of assets wasted or dissipated in anticipation of divorce, however,
equity can only be accomplished if the party who last had the funds
is held accountable for them. The funds must necessarily be con-
sidered marital assets held by the party guilty of waste.
97
Thus, when a spouse dissipates marital assets, those assets should be treated
as part of the dissipating spouse's share of the marital estate.9
Obviously, every expenditure of money at or around the time of
separation is not a dissipation of assets. Although the Booth court noted
that an "exclusive definition" was not possible, the court generally defined
dissipation as expenditures of funds "in anticipation of divorce or separation
... and in derogation of the marital relationship at a time when the
marriage is in jeopardy."" Based on the facts, the court held that funds
spent by the wife for legal fees and support expenses for herself and her
son were not dissipated. The court was not so certain about the stock
market losses and remanded the case back to the trial court for further
proceedings. l °°
The ability to add dissipated assets back to the marital estate may be
of limited use when the dissipating spouse lacks sufficient assets after the
dissipation to pay the monetary award. One possible remedy in this situation
involves invocation of the relevant fraudulent conveyance statutes.' 0' While
no Virginia court has applied Virginia's fraudulent conveyance statutes in
an equitable distribution setting, 102 the court of appeals has held that the
97. Booth v. Booth, 7 Va. App. 22, 371 S.E.2d 569 (1988).
98. For other cases adopting a similar policy-based rule that dissipated assets must be
added to the marital estate even if dissipated before the date of classification, see, e.g., In re
Posinoff, 683 P.2d 377 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984); In re Partyka, 158 Ill. App. 3d 545, 511
N.E.2d 676 (1987); Sharp v. Sharp, 58 Md. App. 386, 473 A.2d 499 (1984); Harrell v. Harrell,
120 A.D.2d 565, 502 N.Y.S.2d 57 (1986).
Courts have reached differing results as to who bears the burden of proving that assets
were dissipated. See In re Partyka, 158 Ill. App. 3d 545, 511 N.E.2d 676 (1987) (spouse
liquidating marital assets while the marriage is breaking down must establish by clear and
convincing evidence that funds were spent for marital purpose); Manaker v. Manaker, 11
Conn. App. 653, 528 A.2d 1170 (1987) (burden on spending party, but preponderance of the
evidence is sufficient to meet burden); Robinette v. Robinette, 736 S.W.2d 351 (Ky. Ct. App.
1987) (dissipation must be proven affirmatively by the nondissipating spouse).
99. Booth, 371 S.E.2d at 572. Expenses for family support universally are held not
dissipated. See In re Sevon, 117 Ill. App. 3d 313, 453 N.E.2d 866 (1983); In re Glessner, 119
Ill. App. 3d 306, 456 N.E.2d 311 (1983); Willis v. Willis, 107 A.D.2d 867, 484 N.Y.S.2d 309
(1985); Roark v. Roark, 694 S.W.2d 912 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
100. Booth, 371 S.E.2d at 573. The result of the remand in Booth is not available, but
the main issue on remand was whether or not the wife's stock investment was made in a good
faith attempt to make a profit. Compare In re Drummond, 156 I1. App. 3d 672, 509 N.E.2d
707, cert. denied, 116 IIl. 2d 652, 515 N.E.2d 105 (1987).
101. VA. CoDa ANN. §§ 55-80, 55-81 (1986). See, e.g., Pattee v. Pattee, 744 P.2d 658
(Alaska 1987); In re Smith, 74 Or. App. 656, 705 P.2d 197 (1985). The current owner of the
fraudulently conveyed property must be joined as a defendant. See Slatton v. Slatton, 289
S.C. 128, 345 S.E.2d 248 (1986).
102. The statutes, however, have been applied in the support setting. In Crowder v.
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courts' normal inherent equitable powers apply in equitable distribution
cases.' °3 These powers arguably include the power to rescind a fraudulent
conveyance.
Virginia's fraudulent conveyance statutes are found in sections 55-80
and 55-81 of the Annotated Code of Virginia. Under section 55-81, all
transfers without consideration are void as against all prior creditors."34 A
spouse with a potential claim for support and property division is clearly a
creditor for fraudulent conveyance purposes. 0 5 This section is an effective
remedy for outright waste of assets, but the section does not apply when
property is sold for less than its fair value.
Under section 55-80, a transfer for consideration is void if the transfer
was made with actual intent to defraud a creditor. 1 6 This statute provides
a theoretical remedy for sales at less than fair value, but two separate
factors limit its effectiveness. First, proving actual intent to defraud is often
very difficult. 0 7 Second, one cannot use the statute to reach property in the
hands of innocent third persons. 10 8 Therefore, the fraudulent conveyance
remedy is powerful when it applies, but problems of proof will often restrict
its practical utility.
Finally, dissipation of assets is a factor that the court can consider in
setting the size of the monetary award. "Just as a court may consider
positive contributions to the marriage in making an equitable distribution
award, a court can also consider 'negative' contributions in the form of
squandering and destroying marital resources."0 9
Crowder, 125 Va. 80, 99 S.E. 746 (1919), the court rescinded a conveyance made by the
husband before the date of separation in order to prevent his wife from receiving alimony
and child support. Similarly, in Wallace v. Wallace, 291 S.E.2d 386 (W. Va. 1982), the West
Virginia court rescinded a conveyance made in defraud of the wife's right to a potential
alimony or property settlement award. The court relied on former W. VA. CODE § 40-101
(1982) (repealed 1986), which is identical to VA. CODE ANN. § 55-80 (1986).
103. Parra v. Parra, 1 Va. App. 118, 336 S.E.2d 157 (1985).
104. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-81 (1986).
105. Crowder v. Crowder, 125 Va. 80, 99 S.E.746 (1919) (allowing wife to rescind
fraudulent conveyance made shortly after husband deserted her but before divorce proceedings
were filed; court specifically described conveyance as fraud on wife's support rights). There is
no reason why a fraudulent conveyance should not similarly be a fraud on the defrauded
spouse's equitable distribution rights.
106. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-80 (1986).
107. The Crowder court recognized the difficulty of proving actual intent to defraud and
expressly noted: ". . . actions speak louder than words, and the transaction itself often
furnishes proof of the fraud that is entirely satisfactory." Crowder, 99 S.E. at 748.
108. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-80 (1986) expressly provides that "[t]his section shall not affect
the title of a purchaser for valuable consideration, unless it appears that he had notice of the
fraudulent intent of his immediate grantor or of the fraud rendering void the title of such
grantor." Again, the Crowder court was aware of this problem and held that once fraud is
proven, it is not necessary to prove "positive knowledge of such fraudulent intent. It is
sufficient if [the third party] has knowledge of such facts and circumstances as would have
excited the suspicion of a man of ordinary care and prudence .. " Crowder, 99 S.E. at 748.
Thus, good faith is negated if the claimant proves facts that would have caused the reasonable
man to investigate the situation further.
109. Booth v. Booth, 7 Va. App. 22, 371 S.E.2d 569 (1988) (citing Anstutz v. Anstutz,
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The second area in which property owned by third parties has been an
issue is property owned by businesses. When one spouse operates a business
as a sole proprietorship, the business is not an independent legal entity, and
assets owned by the business are marital property. Conversely, when the
business is incorporated, property owned by the corporation cannot be
marital property because the property is owned by a third party."0 Courts
have reached differing results on whether the spouse's share of partnership
assets constitutes marital property."'
D. Step 4: Jointly Titled Property
The fourth classification step, like the third, is relatively simple to
apply. If an item of property is titled in the joint names of the husband
and the wife, then the item is marital property regardless of when and how
the couple acquired the item." 2 Thus, separate property placed in joint title
transmutes into marital property as a matter of law.
112 Wis. 2d 10, 331 N.W.2d 844 (Ct. App. 1983)). See also Kaply v. Kaply, 453 N.E.2d 331
(Ind. Ct. App. 1983); Robinette v. Robinette, 736 S.W.2d 351 (Ky. Ct. App. 1987); Smith v.
Smith, 314 N.C. 80, 331 S.E.2d 682 (1985). This result has been reached even in states where
fault does not ordinarily affect equitable distribution. See, e.g., Smith, 331 S.E.2d at 682.
110. See, e.g., Good v. Good, 458 So. 2d 839 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984). Corporate
assets are marital property if the corporation is the sole shareholder's alter ego. Id. Of course,
if the corporate assets cannot be divided, the spouse's corporate stock would be subject to
division.
111. Compare, e.g., MacDonald v. MacDonald, 532 A.2d 1046 (Me. 1987) (holding that
partner's share of partnership's retained earnings are marital property) with Addis v. Addis,
288 Ark. 205, 703 S.W.2d 852 (1986) and Wilen v. Wilen, 61 Md. App. 337, 486 A.2d 775
(1985) (holding that partner's interest in partnership is marital property, but court cannot
divide individual partnership assets).
These two positions may be reconcilable, at least in Virginia. Partners in Virginia have
three statutory property rights: their rights in specific partnership property, their "interest in
the partnership," and their right to participate in partnership management. VA. CODE ANN. §
50-25 (1989). An "interest in the partnership" is the partner's share of the partnership's profits
and surplus. Id. at § 50-26. Because McDonald held only that retained earnings are divisible,
McDonald applies only to the second statutory right, the partner's "interest in the partnership."
By contrast, because Addis and Wilen held only that specific partnership assets other than
retained earnings are not directly divisible, Addis and Wilen apply only to the first of the
three statutory interests. The three cases, therefore, can be read together as saying that only
the second statutory right and the partner's interest in the partnership property as a whole
constitute marital property. This reading would be consistent with VA. CODE ANN. § 50-25,
which protects rights in specific partnership property from assignment or attachment, but
which contains no such protection for interests in partnership profits.
The divisibility of specific partnership assets is not of purely academic interest. As noted
at notes 194-201 infra and accompanying text, separate property transmutes into marital
property in Virginia upon even small amounts of commingling. If the court can divide only
the partnership as a whole, then small marital contributions to one particular asset could cause
an entire separate property partnership interest to transmute. This possibility looms especially
large under the active appreciation rule, see infra notes 202-32 and accompanying text, which
permits a small amount of active appreciation to "taint" the entire partnership. Obviously, if
the court divides individual partnership assets, a small amount of commingling will cause
significantly less transmutation.
112. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(A)(2)(i) (Supp. 1989).
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The jointly titled property rules apply not only when property is titled
jointly at the time of divorce, but also when property is titled jointly at
any time during the marriage. Thus, if separate property is transferred
briefly into joint title during the marriage, the separate property becomes
marital property." 3 Because marital property can never turn back into
separate property, 1 4 any subsequent change in legal title will not change its
classification.
E. Step 5: "[A]cquired. . . during the marriage"
The last two steps are relevant only if the property involved is not titled
jointly. The classification process ends at step four with a finding of marital
property if the property involved is owned jointly.
Under the fifth step, the property involved must have been acquired
during the marriage. The focus here is upon the time rather than the manner
of acquisition. The statute defines a time period, "during the marriage,"
and it requires that a certain "acquisition" must have taken place during
that period."
5
The relevant time period, "during the marriage," clearly begins on the
date of marriage. The date the period ends is generally called the date of
classification,"6 and the Virginia statute does not require the use of any
specific date. The court of appeals has held that this deliberate omission
shows the General Assembly's "intention to leave such determination to the
courts.""17 Because property acquired after the final separation is ordinarily
not a product of the marital partnership, "in most cases the appropriate
date for classification [is] the date of last separation."' 18 The trial court
has the discretion, however, to use a different date if equity so requires.' 9
The Virginia courts have not given any indication of the circumstances
under which the date of final separation should not be the date of classi-
fication. In Price v. Price'20 the court of appeals reversed the trial court's
decision to classify property as of the date of the commissioner's hearing.
The decision was erroneous, the court held, because it "included as marital
property that which was acquired by the husband without the exchange or
pledge of marital assets after the de facto dissolution of the marriage
partnership.' 2' Therefore, the date of classification apparently should be
113. Wagner v. Wagner, 4 Va. App. 397, 358 S.E.2d 407 (1987). Wagner is discussed in
greater detail infra notes 123-126 and accompanying text.
114. Id.
115. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(A)(2)(ii) (Supp. 1989).
116. The date of classification may, but need not be, the same as the date on which the
marital assets are valued, the date of valuation. Questions concerning the date of valuation
are discussed infra notes 244-53 and accompanying text.
117. 4 Va. App. 224, 355 S.E.2d 905, 909 (1987).
118. Price v. Price, 4 Va. App. 224, 335 S.E.2d 905, 909 (1987).
119. Price, 325 S.E.2d at 909.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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as close as possible to the time when the marital partnership actually ends.
If the economic side of the marital relationship continues in some meaningful
form after the final separation, postponement of the date of classification
may well be appropriate.1 2
In most states the date of classification is the only date as of which
property can be classified. In Virginia, however, the date of classification
is merely the last date on which the classification of property can change.
Property is initially classified at a completely different time-the date of
acquisition.
The leading case on initial classification is Wagner v. Wagner.2 3 In
Wagner the wife's father wanted to give her a certain shopping center, but
he also wanted to minimize federal gift taxes. After consulting with a tax
expert, the father had the wife purchase the building from him on credit.
Six months later, intending to make a gift to the wife alone, the father
forgave the debt. When the parties divorced, the wife argued that her
father's unmistakable intent had been to make a gift of the shopping center.
The court of appeals agreed that the father intended a gift, but the
court, nevertheless, held the property to be marital. Property, the court
explained, must be classified as of the date it is initially acquired.' u Because
the shopping center initially was acquired by purchase, it was initially
marital property. Because there is no way under Virginia law in which
marital property can change into separate property, 25 the court felt com-
pelled to hold that the subsequent forgiving of the debt had no effect upon
the classification of the property.
26
Classification of assets, therefore, is a continual process in Virginia.
Property is initially classified when it is acquired, but the initial classification
can change at any time between the date of acquisition and the date of
classification. The potential for change, however, is limited: separate prop-
erty can become marital, but marital property cannot become separate.
Once an asset is classified as marital property the classification process ends
and the asset is marital for as long as the parties continue to own the asset.
Virginia law on the definition of "acquisition" is in a state of complete
confusion. The confusion stems from a failure to separate the definition of
122. For instance, assume that a husband and wife develop a patent during the marriage.
After the separation, the owning spouse conveys the patent to a corporation, which parlays
the patent into a valuable business. If the property is classified as of the date of separation,
the parties own only a somewhat speculative patent. However, the fact is that the jointly
developed patent did prove to be profitable, and as of the date of divorce, the patent is
producing significant income. Under these facts, a strong case can be made for classifying the
property as of some date after the patent was conveyed to the corporation. Cf. Wegman v.
Wegman, 123 A.D.2d 220, 509 N.Y.S.2d 342 (1986) (error to value property as of date of
separation when it had appreciated after date due to success of product developed during
marriage).
123. 4 Va. App. 397, 358 S.E.2d 407 (1987).
124. Wagner v. Wagner, 4 Va. App. 397, 358 S.E.2d 407, 410 (1987).
125. Wagner, 358 S.E.2d at 410.
126. Id.
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"acquisition" from a completely separate issue: the nature of "marital
property." Because these two issues have been interwoven so closely, they
must be considered together.
The debate over the nature of marital property is essentially a dispute
over the relationship between marital property and traditional legal title. In
most equitable distribution states, marital property is seen as a sort of
equitable interest similar to a trust, lien, or easement. 27 While such an
equitable interest may be co-extensive with legal title, it need not be so.
For example, if the owner of property obtains a secured loan for less than
the full value of the property serving as collateral, the resulting lien does
not reach to the full extent of the owner's legal title. While all parts of the
property are subject to the lien, the lienholder's interest does not extend to
the entire property because the amount of the lien is less than the value of
the property. If the lien is foreclosed upon, some portion of the property
or the proceeds from its sale would be returned to the owner. Marital
property in most states is a similar sort of interest that may but need not
attach to the full value of the owner's legal title. For purposes of further
discussion, the majority view on the nature of marital property will be
called the mixed theory of property.
Virginia, however, follows a different rule. In Smoot v. Smoot 2 the
parties built a home, using $20,000 of the husband's separate property and
the proceeds of a $25,000 construction loan. The loan was paid off during
the marriage using marital funds, and upon divorce, the husband claimed
that his separate contribution to the purchase price made the home partly
separate property. The court disagreed: "Code § 20-107.3 contemplates only
two kinds of property-marital property and separate property, each ex-
pressly defined. Our statute does not recognize a hybrid species of prop-
erty." 129 Because the only available classifications were either all marital or
all separate property, the court next had to decide how to classify property
that is acquired with both marital and separate funds. Relying upon the
statutory requirement that separate property must be maintained separately,
the court concluded that "when, as here, a spouse fails to segregate and
instead, commingles separate property with marital property, the court must
classify the commingled property as marital property subject to equitable
distribution.' ' 30 Accordingly, the home was entirely marital property.
In Virginia, therefore, marital property rights are much closer to legal
title. While the marital interest and legal title are not at all similar in effect,
the two interests have exactly the same size and shape, and the marital
127. For a case adopting the mixed theory of property, although not always by that
name, see, e.g., Frank G.W. v. Carol M.W., 457 A.2d 715 (Del. 1983); Harper v. Harper,
294 Md. 54, 448 A.2d 916 (1982); Schmitz v. Schmitz, 309 N.W.2d 748 (Minn. 1981); Wade
v. Wade, 72 N.C. App. 372, 325 S.E.2d 260, cert. denied, 313 N.C. 612, 330 S.E.2d 616
(1985). See generally L. GOLDEN, supra note 6, § 5.07.
128. 233 Va. 435, 357 S.E.2d 728 (1987).
129. Smoot v. Smoot, 233 Va. 435, 357 S.E.2d 728, 731 (1987).
130. Smoot, 357 S.E.2d at 731.
VIRGINIA'S EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION LA W
interest is in essence an equitable shadow of legal title. Because "marital
property" and "separate property" are merely two different forms which
the equitable shadow of legal title may take, it follows logically that the
marital interest in an asset cannot extend to less than the full value of the
property. The position that marital property is an equitable shadow of legal
title rather than a sort of equitable lien attaching to legal title is called the
unitary theory of property.1
31
In order to understand fully Virginia law on the definition of acquisition,
we must first understand the law in other states. There are basically two
different ways in which courts have defined the word "acquired." Most
community property states follow the "inception of title rule," which
provides that property is acquired at the moment the owner obtains legal
title to it. 132 Accordingly, if property is purchased on credit before the
marriage, it is property acquired before the marriage even if the overwhelm-
ing majority of the mortgage payments are made after the marriage.'
Equitable distribution states generally have rejected the inception of title
rule. Instead, most equitable distribution states have held that property is
acquired when and as one pays for it. 34 Under this rule, if property is
acquired on credit shortly before the marriage, part of it was acquired
before the marriage when the downpayment was made, and part of it was
acquired after the marriage as the mortgage payments were made." 5 States
adopting this rule in combination with the mixed theory of marital property
have referred to the combination as the "source of funds rule.'
36
The Virginia courts first considered these two conflicting rules in Smoot
v. Smoot 37 The Smoot court defined the issue as whether the source of
funds rule controls in Virginia, and the Smoot court answered this question
in the negative. 38 As noted above, however, 39 the source of funds rule is
a combination of the mixed theory of marital property and a payment-
based definition of acquisition. The Smoot court rejected the source of
funds rule not because the rule defines acquisition incorrectly but because
131. Unitary property is a clear minority rule that has been adopted only in Virginia and
Illinois. See Smoot, 357 S.E.2d at 728; In re Smith, 86 II1. 2d 518, 529-31, 427 N.E.2d 1239,
1245-46 (1981). Subsequently, the unitary theory of property was overruled in Illinois by ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 40, 503(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987). See infra notes 352-54 and accompanying
text.
132. See, e.g., Fisher v. Fisher, 86 Idaho 131, 383 P.2d 840 (1963). See generally L.
GoLDEN, supra note 6, § 1.06.
133. See, e.g., Pringle v. Pringle, 109 Idaho 1026, 712 P.2d 727 (1985) (reaching result
under inception of title rule).
134. See, e.g., Harper v. Harper, 294 Md. 54, 448 A.2d 916 (1982); Wade v. Wade, 72
N.C. App. 372, 325 S.E.2d 260, cert. denied, 313 N.C. 612, 330 S.E.2d 616 (1985).
135. See, e.g., Wade, 325 S.E.2d at 268.
136. See, e.g., Harper, 448 A.2d at 916; Wade, 325 S.E.2d at 269; Hoffmann v.
Hoffmann, 676 S.W.2d 817 (Mo. 1984). See generally L. GOLDEN, supra note 6, § 5.07A.
137. 233 Va. 435, 357 S.E.2d 728 (1987). See also supra notes 128-30 and accompanying
text.
138. Smoot v. Smoot, 233 Va. 435, 357 S.E.2d 728, 730 (1987).
139. See supra text accompanying note 136.
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the mixed theory of property is inconsistent with Virginia law. Indeed, the
Smoot court said nothing about when property is acquired for purposes of
equitable distribution. Thus, Smoot simply did not consider the definition
of acquisition, and Smoot is not good authority for rejecting any definition
of acquisition that is consistent with the unitary theory of property.
The next Virginia case to consider the definition of acquisition was
Booth v. Booth. 4 The husband in Booth started a corporation before the
parties were married. The corporation increased in value during the mar-
riage, and the wife claimed that the increased value represented property
that had been "acquired" during the marriage. Her claim failed in the trial
court, which held that the corporation was entirely the husband's separate
property.
141
The Virginia Court of Appeals began its decision by discussing the
definition of acquisition. The court defined what it saw as two competing
approaches: inception of title and source of funds. 42 The court emphatically
rejected "the notion that simple inception of title controls our statute"
because of the rule's harsh practical effects. 41 Citing Smoot the court also
noted that the source of funds rule does not apply. 44 After making these
two negative points, however, the court drifted off into a discussion of
transmutation. It never returned to the definition of acquisition, and thus
made no affirmative holding as to what acquisition is. Booth tells us only
what acquisition is not: it is not inception of title and not source of funds.
Booth further confused the issue by implying in dicta that Virginia is
among "those courts rejecting a dynamic [payment based] definition of
acquisition.' ' 45 This dicta is based upon the court's erroneous definition of
the source of funds rule. Like many other courts, the Booth court believed
that the "source of funds rule" is merely another name for a payment-
based definition of acquisition. As noted above, this is untrue because the
source of funds rule is a combination of the mixed theory of property and
a payment-based definition of acquisition. 46 Smoot rejected source of funds
only because it rejected the mixed theory of property, and Smoot said
nothing about the definition of acquisition. Thus, contrary to the Booth
dicta, Smoot's rejection of the source of funds rule does not require that
140. No. 0981-86-3, slip op. at I (Va. Ct. App. Feb. 2, 1988). The Booth opinion
subsequently was withdrawn for rehearing. When the opinion was reissued, the court deleted
the transmutation discussion on grounds that the issue had not been properly presented by the
appellant. Nevertheless, the deleted portion of the opinion is entirely consistent with prior and
subsequent cases and provides a valuable insight into the court's thinking on transmutation
questions. Accordingly, the slip opinion will be considered and discussed in this article as if
it still were good law.
141. Booth v. Booth, No. 0981-86-3, slip op. at 5 (Va. Ct. App. Feb. 2, 1988). The trial
court's decision is reported in Booth v. Booth, 4 Va. Cir. 335 (Campbell County 1985).
142. Booth, slip op. at 6-8.
143. Id. at 8.
144. Id. at 7.
145. Id.
146. See supra text accompanying note 136.
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a payment-based definition of acquisition similarly be rejected. In fact, no
Virginia court, including the Booth and Smoot courts, has considered a
payment-based definition of acquisition on its merits.
Moreover, although the Smoot court did not expressly define acquisition,
the court's reasoning process necessarily may imply a payment-based defi-
nition of that term. The Smoot decision was based upon the concept that
a commingled mixture of marital and separate property becomes marital.
The court expressly stated that such commingling had occurred when the
parties used marital funds to make mortgage payments on a separate
property home.' 47 But the parties did not actually take a separate asset in
one hand, a marital asset in the other, and mix the two together. Indeed,
there was no distinct asset, either separate or marital, that the parties mixed
with the marital home in any way. 4 The only way in which a commingling
of assets could have occurred is if part of the home itself had been purchased
with marital funds-that is, if part of the home was "acquired" as the
mortgage payments were made. The Smoot court's finding that marital
property had been commingled with the separate property home is hard to
explain except by assuming that mortgage payments constitute partial ac-
quisitions of property.
Another case relevant to the definition of acquisition is Trivett v.
Trivett.'49 In Trivett the court considered the effect of marital debts upon
the valuation of marital property. The court held that when the debt is an
encumbrance upon a specific piece of property, the trial court must subtract
the amount of the debt in computing the value of the underlying property.Y5 0
Unsecured debts, by contrast, are not subtracted from the value of any
property and are considered only as an equitable factor in arriving at the
overall monetary award.' 5 ' Although Trivett spoke in terms of valuation,
the case is consistent with a payment-based definition of acquisition because
property purchased on secured credit is not acquired until the debt is paid
off and the creditor's lien vanishes.
Thus, the definition of acquisition is unclear under Virginia law. Courts
have rejected emphatically the rule that inception of title controls in all
147. See Smoot v. Smoot, 233 Va. 435, 357 S.E.2d 728, 731 (1987) ("[W]hen, as here, a
spouse fails to segregate and instead, commingles, separate property with marital property,
the chancellor must classify the commingled property as marital property subject to equitable
distribution") (emphasis added).
148. It is a misleading simplification to argue that the marital funds used to pay the
mortgage somehow were commingled directly with the property involved. Money is an intangible
asset, and there is no way to commingle money with a tangible physical asset such as a house
or car. Spouses can commingle marital funds with separate property physical assets only
indirectly by using the funds to purchase other physical assets that are then used for the actual
commingling. If marital funds were commingled with the home in Smoot, the marital funds
must have been used to purchase some physical asset which was then commingled with the
home.
149. 7 Va. App. 148, 371 S.E.2d 560 (1988).
150. Trivett v. Trivett, 7 Va. App. 148, 371 S.E.2d 560, 562 (1980).
151. Trivett, 371 S.E.2d at 562.
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cases, but courts have not said what rule controls in its place. A review of
the reported cases suggests two different possibilities. First, although incep-
tion of title does not control in all cases, nothing in the reported case law
would prevent it from controlling in some cases. Virginia, therefore, could
follow inception of title as a general principle subject to a number of vague,
undefined exceptions to be established by future case law.
15 2
Second, because the Virginia cases are applying tacitly a payment-based
definition of "acquired," future Virginia cases could hold that property is
acquired as one pays for it. Such a rule would not change in any significant
way the result in any case that has been decided under the unitary theory
of property. In particular, adoption of such a rule would not be fully
consistent with Smoot's rejection of the source of funds rule because
property acquired both before and during the marriage would continue to
be marital property under Smoot.
153
There are strong reasons why Virginia should consider a payment-based
definition of acquisition. One of the most significant equitable distribution
problems Virginia courts and attorneys face is the "authority gap"-the
almost complete lack of authority in this state on a vast number of equitable
distribution questions. The only factor that makes the authority gap man-
ageable is that on at least some equitable distribution questions, Virginia
follows generally recognized nationwide rules. Thus, Virginia courts can use
authority from other states that follow the same rules. When Virginia,
however, adopts unique rules that generally are not followed, a body of
relevant out-of-state authority is lost, and the authority gap problem be-
comes critical. The resulting confusion on key legal questions causes in-
creased court workloads, increased costs for litigants, and inconsistent trial
court decisions. Whenever possible, therefore, Virginia should strive to state
152. For instance, several cases have held that property acquired before the marriage is
marital property if it is acquired in contemplation of marriage and the parties are married
shortly after its acquisition. Stallings v. Stallings, 75 Ill. App. 3d 96, 393 N.E.2d 1065 (1979);
Coney v. Coney, 207 N.J. Super. 63, 503 A.2d 912 (1985); Raspa v. Raspa, 207 N.J. Super.
371, 504 A.2d 683 (Ch. Div. 1985). A similar rule might be one possible equitable exception
if Virginia decides to follow inception of title in most cases. Note, however, that other courts
have rejected these holdings and held that all property acquired before the marriage is separate.
See, e.g., Wilen v. Wilen, 61 Md. App. 337, 486 A.2d 775 (1985); Cummings v. Cummings,
376 N.W.2d 726 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985); Mangone v. Mangone, 202 N.J. Super. 505, 495
A.2d 469 (Ch. Div. 1985).
153. In other words, a payment-based definition of acquisition indicates when property
is acquired. The consequences of acquisition, however, depend upon whether the jurisdiction
involved follows unitary or mixed property. Thus, in a source of funds state, property paid
for both before and after the marriage is acquired partly before and partly after the marriage
and, therefore, is both marital and separate property. If Virginia were to define acquisition
as payment, property paid for both before and after the marriage would be acquired both
before and after the marriage, but under Smoot, marital and separate funds would be mixed
in the same asset, and the separate funds would transmute into marital property. Adoption
of a payment-based definition of acquired in Virginia, therefore, would not constitute adoption
of the source of funds rule or be inconsistent in any way with the principles of unitary
property.
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its law in terms of concepts understood and followed in other states. A
properly applied payment-based definition of acquisition is consistent with
Virginia's unitary property system and would go far toward reducing the
authority gap in Virginia's equitable distribution law.
F. Step 6: "[Which is not separate property"
The sixth step, like the fifth step, applies only if the property involved
is not jointly titled. Under this step, there are a number of specific types
of property acquired during the marriage that are defined expressly as
separate property. 5 4 Any property acquired during the marriage that falls
outside these specific definitions must be classified as marital property. One
word of caution: it is incorrect to assume that all interests are marital
property unless an interest falls within a specific definition of separate
property. The Virginia statute expressly provides that an interest cannot be
marital property unless it constitutes property one or both spouses acquired
during the marriage. Interests that do not constitute property, that are not
owned by a spouse, or that were not acquired during the marriage are not
marital property even though they fall outside all of the specific definitions
of separate property.
1. Premarital Property
The Virginia statute expressly defines property acquired before the
marriage as separate property.155 This provision is co-extensive with the
general requirement that marital property be acquired during the marriage,
and the discussion of the phrase, "acquired during the marriage," in step
five above applies here as well.1
56
2. Gifts and Inheritances
The statute also defines as separate property "all property acquired
during the marriage by bequest, devise, descent, survivorship, or gift from
a source other than the other party. .... ,,157 Stripped of excess verbiage,
this definition of separate property applies to two types of property: gifts
and inheritances. Both the gift and inheritance exclusions apply only to
property given to or inherited by one spouse alone. 5 8 If the donor's intent
was to benefit both spouses jointly-to make a gift to the "marital estate"-
154. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(A)(1)(i-iii) (Supp. 1989).
155. Id. § 20-107.3(A)(1)(i).
156. See generally supra notes 115-53 and accompanying text.
157. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(A)(1)(ii) (Supp. 1989).
158. See Loeb v. Loeb, 72 N.C. App. 205, 324 S.E.2d 33, cert. denied, 313 N.C. 508,
329 S.E.2d 393 (1985); Barr v. Barr, 287 S.C. 13, 336 S.E.2d 481 (1985). Whether the gift is
to the parties as joint owners is an important factor in determining the donor's intent, but it
does not control the issue. See Barr, 336 S.E.2d at 481 (holding that father's forgiveness of
mortgage on home was gift to husband alone even though home was titled jointly and mortgage
was in both parties' names).
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then the property involved constitutes marital property. 59 The general
definition of a gift for equitable distribution purposes should be no different
from the definition of a gift. 160 Under Virginia law, there are three elements
of a valid gift: intent, delivery, and acceptance.'
6'
The most significant of these factors is intent. Donative intent is present
when the donor clearly intends to provide some benefit without any expec-
tation of repayment.' 62 Whether or not a transaction purports to be a gift
is not determinative. Loans to a spouse from a close family member, for
example, often are found to be gifts when there is no legitimate expectation
of repayment. 63 A gift is likely to result if the lender forgives all or part
of the debt.'6 Conversely, courts have found nominal gifts to be something
else altogether if the supposed gift is given in return for some past or future
consideration. 65 Transactions that appear to be gifts always should be
scrutinized closely to see if donative intent actually existed.
159. See, e.g., Cronin v. Cronin, 372 N.W.2d 778 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
160. See Semasek v. Semasek, 509 Pa. 282, 502 A.2d 109 (1985) (applying pre-equitable
distribution definition of gift to determine whether property was acquired by gift for equitable
distribution purposes).
161. See Rust v. Phillips, 208 Va. 573, 159 S.E.2d 628 (1968); Payne v.Tobacco Trading
Corp., 179 Va. 156, 18 S.E.2d 281 (1942).
162. 38 AM. JuR. 2D Gifts §§ 1-2 (1968).
163. See, e.g., Richardson v. Richardson, 280 Ark. 498, 659 S.W.2d 510 (1983) (wife
bought land using money given to her by mother, then gave mother proceeds from sale of
trees harvested from the land; held, loan and repayment); In re Cook, 117 Ill. App. 3d 844,
453 N.E.2d 1357 (1983) (wife received money from her father; conflicting evidence over whether
father expected repayment; held, gift). Note, however, that when property is purchased with
the loan proceeds before the debt is forgiven, the property is marital notwithstanding the
subsequent forgiveness. Wagner v. Wagner, 4 Va. App. 397, 358 S.E.2d 407 (1987).
164. See In re Moon, 378 N.W.2d 49 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985); Barr v. Barr, 287 S.C. 13,
336 S.E.2d 481 (Ct. App. 1985).
165. See, e.g., Campion v.Campion, 385 N.W.2d I (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (father gave
son business on condition that son increase store's yearly sales; held, not gift, but transfer for
consideration). A somewhat harder question is presented when one spouse receives an inheri-
tance in exchange for some consideration. For instance, assume that the wife's elderly aunt
promises the wife a substantial inheritance if the wife takes care of her until death. The wife
agrees and spends substantial time with the aunt, causing the husband to assume a dispropor-
tionate share of the housekeeping and child-raising duties. Is the wife's inheritance marital
property? The question has not been presented in any equitable distribution jurisdiction.
Community property states, however, traditionally have found such contractual bequests to be
community property. See, e.g., Frymire v. Brown, 94 Cal. App. 2d 334, 210 P.2d 707 (1949).
See generally DEFuN ac & BROWN, PRiNcPLES OF CoMMuirry PROPERTY 562 (2d ed. 1971).
The community property rule is consistent with the general concept that the marital estate
should include all funds given to either spouse as compensation for marital labors. Ideally, it
should not matter whether that compensation takes the form of a salary, a gift, or an
inheritance. Conversely, the Virginia statute expressly states that all inheritances are separate
property, and if the statute is construed strictly, a Virginia court might be forced to classify
contractual bequests as separate property. While the court probably could consider the
contractual nature in dividing the other marital property, such a remedy would be of limited
effect when the remaining marital property is small. A liberal construction of the inheritance
exception that limits it to truly donative inheritances seems most consistent with the Virginia
General Assembly's intention to divide equitably all fruits of both parties' marital labors.
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Delivery and acceptance are not an issue in many equitable distribution
cases. When a close relative gave property to one spouse but maintained
significant control over the property, one court found an absence of
delivery.'6 Finally, gifts are separate property in Virginia only if the donor
is not the recipient's spouse. 167 Interspousal gifts, therefore, are marital
property under Virginia law.
3. Exchanges
The Virginia statute also expressly defines as separate property any
property acquired in exchange for separate property. 68 Under Virginia's
marital property presumption, the burden of proof is upon the party seeking
to trace an asset back to an exchange for separate property. 69
Because Virginia follows unitary property 70 and strict transmutation,17'
tracing is somewhat different in Virginia than in other states. In most states
any part of an asset traceable to separate property is treated as separate
property, but in Virginia an asset is marital property if any part of it can
be traced to a marital source. 72 Tracing, therefore, has greater consequences
in Virginia than in most other states.
One of the most litigated questions involving the exchange exception is
the classification of personal injury and workers' compensation awards. 73
Some states have held that these benefits are separate property to the extent
that the awards represent damages for pain and suffering because they are
given in rough "exchange" for an asset brought into the marriage-the
suffering spouse's good health. 17 4 Conversely, to the extent that these benefits
represent compensation for lost wages, they are marital property if the lost
wages would have been marital property had they been received. 75 Other
states, noting that there is no specific statutory provision providing that
personal injury and workers' compensation awards are separate property,
have held that these benefits are marital. 176
166. In re Agazim, 147 Ill. App. 3d 646, 498 N.E.2d 742 (1986).
167. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(A)(1)(ii) (Supp. 1989).
168. Id. § 20-107.3(A)(1)(iii).
169. See supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 128-31 and accompanying text.
171. See infra notes 189-223 and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 196-99 and accompanying text.
173. Some courts have held that a cause of action for personal injury is not property if
it is still unliquidated on the date of classification. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying
text. Whether the personal injury cause of action is property is a completely separate issue
from whether it is acquired in exchange for separate property.
174. See, e.g., Campbell v. Campbell, 255 Ga. 461, 339 S.E.2d 591 (1986); Weakley v.
Weakley, 731 S.W.2d 243 (Ky. 1987); Johnson v. Johnson, 317 N.C. 437, 346 S.E.2d 430
(1986).
175. See, e.g., Miller v. Miller, 739 P.2d 163 (Alaska 1987) (compensation for lost wages
received during marriage is marital property while compensation for lost wages before or after
marriage is separate property).
176. See, e.g., Gan v. Gan, 83 Ill. App. 3d 265, 404 N.E.2d 306 (1980); In re McNerney,
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The issue has not arisen in Virginia. The latter position, however, seems
more consistent with Virginia law. While a personal injury award may or
may not be a single asset for purposes of unitary property, Virginia courts
have held in a number of different contexts that an asset is marital property
if there is any marital interest in it. 177 Even if part of a personal injury
award would be separate property under the exchange exception, in most
cases part of the award also would be marital property. Classification of
the entire award as marital property, therefore, seems most consistent with
the unitary theory of property.
78
4. Income and Appreciation
Under the Virginia statute, separate property includes both income from
and appreciation in other separate property. 79 Unlike similar statutes in
other states, 80 the Virginia statute applies to all types of appreciation and
income regardless of whether the appreciation or income was caused by
marital funds or efforts.' 8' The statutory provision, however, provides only
that income and appreciation are initially separate property. Nothing in the
statute prevents either income or appreciation from subsequently becoming
marital property under the principle of transmutation.
8 2
5. Property Excluded by Agreement
The Virginia statute does not expressly state that property which the
parties classify by agreement must be classified the same way by the court.
Other Virginia statutes, however, provide that separation agreements,'
antenuptial agreements, 8 4 and midnuptial agreements'8 5 are generally en-
417 N.W.2d 205 (Iowa 1987); Orszula v. Orszula, 292 S.C. 264, 356 S.E.2d 114 (1987); cf.
Richardson v. Richardson, 139 Wis. 2d 778, 407 N.W.2d 231 (1987) (medical malpractice
award is entirely marital property, but because pain and suffering is unique to injured spouse,
there should be a presumption that pain and suffering component of award goes entirely to
injured spouse).
177. See infra notes 188-222 and accompanying text.
178. Of course, if the award is entirely marital property, there certainly is no requirement
that it be divided equally. Absent unusual circumstances, the injured spouse should receive far
more than half of the award, especially if the injury will cause continued pain and suffering
even after the marriage ends.
179. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(A)(1)(iii) (Supp. 1989).
180. See, e.g., Wade v. Wade, 72 N.C. App. 372, 325 S.E.2d 260 (interpreting almost
identical statute to apply only to "passive" appreciation caused by inflation or normal market
forces and not to "active" appreciation caused by marital funds or efforts), cert. denied, 313
N.C. 612, 330 S.E.2d 616 (1985).
181. Booth v. Booth, No. 0981-86-3, slip op. at 7 (Va. Ct. App. Feb. 2, 1988). Although
the Booth opinion subsequently was modified after rehearing, the deleted portions of the
opinion provide valuable insight into how the court is likely to resolve future cases. See supra
note 140.
182. See infra notes 202-32 and accompanying text.
183. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(H) (Supp. 1989).
184. Id. § 20-150(3) (agreements executed on or after July 1, 1986); id. § 20-154 (prior
agreements).
185. Id. § 20-155.
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forceable. Under these statutes, the Virginia courts have held that "to the
extent the parties already have stipulated to a particular disposition of their
property, the court may not decree an equitable distribution award that is
inconsistent with that contract."''8 6 Thus, courts are likely to respect any
valid agreement between the parties that classifies part or all of the property
as separate.
Virginia's de facto agreement exclusion also may apply to implied
agreements. Such agreements are usually at issue when one spouse transfers
certain property to the other spouse shortly before the separation, often as
part of an abortive attempt at reconciliation. Courts faced with such
transfers have found the transferred property to be separate if the parties
mutually intended that the transferee keep the property in the event the
marriage failed.1 17 Whether such an intent existed is generally a hotly
contested issue of fact.'
6. Transmutation
Property that falls under one of the five preceding categories is initially
separate property under Virginia law. Property that is initially separate,
however, does not necessarily remain separate. The theory of transmutation
provides that under certain circumstances, separate property may "trans-
mute" into marital property.
8 9
Virginia is one of a very limited number of states whose equitable
distribution statute expressly adopts transmutation.' 90 The General Assembly
expressly provided that property exchanged for separate property remains
separate only "if such property acquired during the marriage is maintained
as separate property."' 9' While this provision on its face applies only to
property exchanged for separate property, courts have not hesitated to apply
the doctrine to all types of separate property.1
92
186. Parra v. Parra, 1 Va. App. 118, 336 S.E.2d 157, 162-63 (1985). The parties in Parra
divided the marital home and several condominiums in a valid separation agreement. The
agreement did not dispose of all of the parties' property, but the court held that the trial
court was bound by the parties' disposition of all property covered by the contract. Parra,
336 S.E.2d at 163. In other words, only those assets not divided in the contract could constitute
marital property for monetary award purposes. See also Bragan v. Bragan, 4 Va. App. 516,
358 S.E.2d 757 (1987) (stating that general waiver of future claims prevented claim for equitable
distribution even though waiver was executed before § 20-107.3 was enacted).
187. Barner v. Barner, 246 Pa. Super. 1, 527 A.2d 122 (1987) (finding transferred property
to be separate); cf. In re Rink, 136 I11. App. 252, 483 N.E.2d 316 (1985) (holding that bank
account transferred into joint names remained husband's separate property where transfer was
made only to facilitate withdrawals by blind husband, and there was no intent to give wife
any interest enforceable upon divorce).
188. Barner, 527 A.2d at 122.
189. See generally L. GOLDEN, supra note 6, §§ 5.33-.36.
190. The only other state whose statute expressly recognizes transmutation is Illinois. See
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 503 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989).
191. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(A)(1)(lii) (Supp. 1989).
192. For instance, in Westbrook v. Westbrook, 5 Va. App. 446, 364 S.E.2d 523 (1988),
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Transmutation is probably one of the most discussed and least under-
stood concepts in modern American law. The doctrine is followed in some
form in almost every equitable distribution and community property state, 93
but courts rarely explain how or why the doctrine is used in any particular
case. Instead, like a magician waving a magic wand, when courts utter the
mystic phrase "transmutation," separate property suddenly becomes marital.
Making sense of the transmutation cases is especially difficult because
transmutation never has been a rigidly defined or applied doctrine. Instead,
courts use transmutation to reach a "right" result that cannot be reached
by any other means. Although this general equitable use of transmutation
has improved the fairness of individual equitable distribution decisions, it
has created a general law of transmutation that lacks clarity and consistency.
In considering the law of transmutation, we always must keep in mind the
fairness of the result were transmutation not applied. If failure to apply
the doctrine would lead to an unjust result, the court will be more likely
to apply the doctrine than a dispassionate assessment of the facts might
otherwise indicate.
Despite the above caveat, transmutation is not by any means completely
free from rules or principles. Virginia courts have identified two basic types
of transmutation, commingling and implied gift.
a. Commingling
The first type of transmutation will be called transmutation by com-
mingling. The first commingling decision in Virginia was Price v. Price.'94
The parties in Price created a ring by remounting stones from two other
rings. One of the rings was separate property while the other ring was
marital property. The Price court held: "When separate property is com-
bined or commingled with marital property in the manner that these rings
were, the separate property loses its character as separate property and the
'new' property created is marital."' 95 Thus, under the principle of commin-
gling, an inseparable mixture of separate and marital property becomes
marital in its entirety. Any separate property put into such a mixture
transmutes and becomes completely marital.
The most crucial part of the doctrine of commingling is determining
whether a mixture of marital and separate property is inseparable. This
question received detailed consideration in the next transmutation case,
Smoot v. Smoot.' 96 Smoot concerned the classification of a house that was
purchased with a separate property downpayment. The mortgage payments,
the court of appeals held that property acquired before the marriage transmuted into marital
property. The court did not discuss the possibility that transmutation might apply only to
property acquired in exchange for other separate property.
193. See generally L. GOLDEN, supra note 6, § 5.33.
194. 4 Va. App. 224, 355 S.E.2d 905 (1987).
195. Price v. Price, 4 Va. App. 224, 355 S.E.2d 905, 912 (1987).
196. 233 Va. 435, 357 S.E.2d 728 (1987).
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however, were made with marital property, and the court assumed without
discussion that the mortgage payments were either partial acquisitions of
the home or contributions so close to acquisition as to cause commingling.
The Smoot court addressed the question of whether the mixture of marital
and separate property was inseparable. As discussed above, the court held
that property must be either all marital or all separate.197 Accordingly, even
though the marital and separate contributions to the home's value could be
separate in fact, they could not be separated in law. Because the mixture
was legally inseparable, the court held that the entire home transmuted into
marital property.
The difference between legal and factual inseparability is key to under-
standing Virginia's version of the law of commingling. In states where
property can be part marital and part separate, property is commingled
only when there is insufficient evidence to prove as a matter of fact how
much separate property and how much marital property were placed into
the overall mixture. In Virginia, however, the question of factual insepar-
ability is irrelevant. Instead, whenever separate and marital property are
mixed together in any way, the entire mixture is automatically marital. The
separate portion transmutes into marital property regardless of whether or
not the marital and separate contributions reliably can be identified.
The most recent Virginia commingling case, Booth v. Booth, 98 shows
how far the Virginia courts will go in applying commingling. In Booth the
husband owned a separate property corporation that encountered financial
difficulties. To keep the corporation in business, the husband loaned the
corporation over $12,000 in marital funds, and the wife agreed to guarantee
certain corporate debts. Upon divorce, the wife argued that marital funds
had been commingled with the corporation, and the husband defended by
stressing that the marital property contribution to the corporation was quite
small in reference to the corporation's overall value. Although the court
recognized the small size of the marital contribution, the Booth court held
that the entire corporation had transmuted into marital property. 199 If the
corporation were marital, the court held that the wife could be awarded
only a small interest in it if she contributed slightly to it; however, if the
corporation were separate, the wife automatically would receive none of
it.2m In order to compensate the marital estate for its admittedly small
contribution to the corporation, the corporation had to be classified as
marital property.
Booth is quite representative of how Virginia courts are likely to apply
the doctrine of transmutation. In states following the mixed theory of
property, small marital contributions to a separate asset can yield a small
marital interest while the majority of the asset continues to be separate
197. See supra notes 128-31 and accompanying text.
198. No. 0981-86-3, slip op. (Va. Ct. App. Feb. 2, 1988).
199. Booth v. Booth, No. 0981-86-3, slip op. (Va. Ct. App. Feb. 2, 1988).
200. Id. at 10-11.
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property. In Virginia, however, such small marital contributions can yield
only two results: all separate property or all marital property. Neither of
these two results is particularly attractive in a small contribution case, but
the all separate property option gives the marital estate no compensation
for a relatively small but valuable contribution. While the all marital
property option makes the entire property subject to division, courts still
retain the power to divide the asset unequally, compensating the marital
estate in proportion to the size of the contribution. The all marital property
option, therefore, is the least unfavorable of the limited options permitted
by unitary property. To preserve at least the possibility of making an
equitable distribution, Virginia courts probably will continue to find very
small amounts of commingling sufficient to change separate property into
marital property.
20'
The Virginia statute is ambiguous as to what happens when the doctrine
of commingling collides with the general rule that appreciation in separate
property remains separate. The Virginia Court of Appeals addressed this
question in Lambert v. Lambert.2 2 The husband in Lambert owned a
separate property corporation that appreciated during the marriage. The
trial court held that all the appreciation was separate property regardless of
source, and thus, classified the entire corporation as marital. 2 3 Lambert
conceded that under Smoot the appreciation could not be classified differ-
ently from the underlying property.2°4 The court, however, saw no reason
why sometimes appreciation might not cause the entire property to trans-
mute:
[Smoot's] adoption of both the unitary concept of property and
the concept of transmuting separate property ... necessarily sug-
gest, however, that the [appreciation exclusion] may not apply to
all circumstances. Unquestionably, the statute applies to appreciation
in value caused by economic factors. However, our belief that
Smoot embraces the doctrine of transmutation leads us to conclude
that the statute may not bar the transmutation of separate property
to marital property when there is no appreciation in value of the
separate property due to the efforts of either or both spouses during
the marriage. (emphasis added)205
The court remanded Lambert for further consideration in light of Smoot
and other transmutation decisions.
2°6
201. For recent Virginia commingling cases, see Lassen v. Lassen, -. Va. App.
383 S.E.2d 471 (1989); Holmes v. Holmes, 7 Va. App. 472, 375 S.E.2d 387 (1988). Both
Holmes and Lassen involved a very common tracing situation, mixture of marital and separate
funds in a joint bank account.
202. 6 Va. App. 94, 367 S.E.2d 184 (1988).
203. Lambert v. Lambert, 6 Va. App. 94, 367 S.E.2d 184, 186 (1988).
204. Lambert, 367 S.E.2d at 190.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 191.
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A similar situation arose in Ellington v. Ellington. 7 In Ellington the
trial court found that the appreciation in certain stock was marital property
even though the underlying value of the stock was separate property. The
court of appeals reversed this holding for violating unitary property prin-
ciples, 28 but the court did not hold that the entire stock was separate
property. Instead, citing Lambert 209 the court of appeals remanded the case
with instructions to classify the stock as entirely marital if the wife's
"affirmative efforts" were "sufficient to transmute the stock into marital
property. "210
Thus, the Lambert and Ellington courts seemed to draw a distinction
between appreciation caused by marital funds or efforts ("active" appre-
ciation) and appreciation caused by inflation or normal market conditions
("passive" appreciation). This distinction also has been drawn by the courts
of Illinois, the only other unitary property state. In In re Lee21' the parties
owned a home that was the husband's separate property. The home appre-
ciated in value during the marriage as a result of certain improvements
made by the parties with marital funds. The wife argued that the improve-
ments caused the entire home to transmute into marital property. The
husband argued in opposition that under the Illinois statute appreciation in
separate property remains separate. The court summarily rejected this ar-
gument, noting that the increase in value "was clearly the result of contri-
bution by the parties." 21 2 When contribution exists, the court held that the
parties' contributions are sufficient to cause transmutation. 213 Accordingly,
the home was entirely marital property.
Unfortunately, the Lee court did not explain in any detail at all precisely
why the appreciation exclusion did not apply when the appreciation was
caused by marital contributions. Nevertheless, there are two separate reasons
why this result was appropriate. First, the appreciation exclusion does not
state that all appreciation in separate property remains separate for all time
under all conditions; it states only that separate property does not change
in character merely because it appreciates. 2 4 In other words, while appre-
ciation by itself does not create marital property, appreciation in separate
property can be marital property for some reason other than the fact of
appreciation itself. Transmutation, therefore, takes precedence over the strict
language of the appreciation exclusion.
Second, other states with similar statutes have applied appreciation
exclusion only to "passive" appreciation. 2 5 If the exclusion applies to
207. 8 Va. App. 48, 378 S.E.2d 626 (1989).
208. See supra notes 128-31 and accompanying text.
209. Lambert v. Lambert, 6 Va. App. 94, 367 S.E.2d 184 (1988).
210. Ellington v. Ellington, 8 Va. App. 48, 378 S.E.2d, 626, 629 (1989).
211. 87 I11. 2d 64, 430 N.E.2d 1030 (1981).
212. In Re Lee, 87 Ill. 2d 64, 430 N.E.2d 1030, 1031 (1981).
213. In re Lee, 430 N.E.2d at 1031.
214. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(A)(1)(iii) (Supp. 1989).
215. See, e.g., Hoffmann v. Hoffmann, 676 S.W.2d 817 (Mo. 1984) (adopting active/
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"active" appreciation caused by marital contributions, the exclusion would
frustrate the legislative purpose by denying the non-owning spouse compen-
sation for marital contributions to separate property. Although unitary
property prevents Virginia from classifying active and passive appreciation
differently,2 6 there is no reason why the general principles of active and
passive appreciation should not be a useful analogy in applying the doctrine
of transmutation.
2 17
It is important to remember that most active/passive appreciation ju-
risdictions follow mixed property. Because Virginia follows unitary prop-
erty, 21s most active/passive decisions are inconsistent with Virginia law. The
difference is one of effect: active appreciation causes dual classification in
mixed property states and transmutation in unitary property states. Lam-
bert's definition of active appreciation, however, is very similar to definitions
made by courts in mixed property states. 219 Thus, as long as Virginia courts
keep in mind the difference in the effect of active appreciation, there is no
reason why mixed property decisions on the definition of active appreciation
should not be helpful in defining that term under Virginia law.
A review of active appreciation decisions from other states reveals three
key questions on which Virginia has yet to take a position. First, although
the Lambert court clearly anticipated that active appreciation could be
caused by the efforts of either the owning or the non-owning spouse, the
court did not attempt to define what it meant by "efforts." In some states,
only uncompensated efforts are relevant, and to the extent the husband
received a fair salary, the husband's efforts will not cause active apprecia-
tion.220 In other states, appreciation not caused by inflation or the free
passive rule despite Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.330(2) (Vernon Supp. 1989), which provides that
"'marital property' means all property acquired by either spouse subsequent to the marriage
except ... [t]he increase in value of property acquired prior to the marriage"); Wade v.
Wade, 72 N.C. App. 372, 325 S.E.2d 260 (adopting active/passive rule despite N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 50-20(2) (1987), which provides that "the increase in value of separate property ...
shall be considered separate property"), cert. denied, 313 N.C. 612, 330 S.E.2d 616 (1985).
Indeed, no state with a statute similar to Virginia's has refused to compensate the marital
estate in some way when marital contributions cause appreciation in separate property.
216. See supra notes 128-31 and accompanying text.
217. The Virginia Supreme Court already has recognized that theories used in mixed
property states may be helpful in construing the Virginia statute even if those theories are
strictly inconsistent with the unitary theory of property. See Smoot v. Smoot, 233 Va. 435,
442, 357 S.E.2d 728, 732 (1987) (holding that trial judge properly considered rationale
underlying source of funds rule "as a useful analogy in his construction of Virginia's statutory
scheme of equitable distribution," even though court rejected source of funds rule on merits).
218. See supra notes 130-33 and accompanying text.
219. Compare, e.g., Lambert v. Lambert, 6 Va. App. 94, 367 S.E.2d 184 (1988) (stating
that property may transmute "when there is an appreciation in value of the separate property
due to the efforts of either or both of the parties during the marriage") with Wade v. Wade,
72 N.C. App. 372, 325 S.E.2d 260 (stating that marital property includes "active appreciation
resulting from the contributions, monetary or otherwise," by one or both spouses), cert.
denied, 313 N.C. 612, 330 S.E.2d 616 (1985).
220. See, e.g., Hoffmann v. Hoffmann, 676 S.W.2d 817 (Mo. 1984) (finding appreciation
passive because husband's salary was fair and reasonable).
VIRGINIA'S EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION LAW
market is seen as just another form of income, and the adequacy of the
husband's salary is irrelevant. 22' The difference is in direction of approach:
the first rule requires proof that appreciation resulted from uncompensated
efforts, and the second rule assumes that appreciation is active unless proven
to come from a passive source.
Second, the Lambert court talked only generally about the quantity of
efforts required to create active appreciation, requiring that the efforts be
"significant to the marital relationship." 222 The court did not explain the
meaning of this phrase at all, but Virginia courts have emphasized that
classification as marital allows the court to give the non-owning spouse an
award proportionate to his or her contributions, while classification as
separate property requires that the non-owning spouse receive no share of
the property at all.m Given this emphasis, a strong case can be made that
Lambert's "significant to the marital relationship" test establishes a very
low threshold.?
The subject was discussed further in Taylor v. Taylor.m The husband
in Taylor placed his separate property into a joint bank account where he
also deposited his weekly salary checks. He then withdrew money from the
account to purchase other property. The court held:
We find that the evidence before us mandates a conclusion that the
marital property commingled by the husband was significant to the
marital relationship. The marital property in question was the
husband's salary. It was a major source of the parties' income at
the time it was commingled with the [separate property deposits],
and therefore represented an amount of money that was significant
to the marital relationship at the time.m
The most interesting thing about Taylor is not the answer the court gave,
but the question it asked. The court did not compare the size of the original
separate property deposit with the amount of marital property placed into
the account; indeed, these figures were not given anywhere in the court's
opinion. Nor did the court compare the amount of either the separate
property or the marital property deposits with the amount of the withdrawal;
indeed, the court expressly stated that "our conclusion is not altered by the
fact that the [amount of the withdrawals] did not exceed the amount of
221. See, e.g., Wade v. Wade, 72 N.C. App. 372, 325 S.E.2d 260, cert. denied, 313 N.C.
612, 330 S.E.2d 616 (1985); McLeod v. McLeod, 74 N.C. App. 144, 327 S.E.2d 910 (1985).
222. Lambert, 367 S.E.2d at 190.
223. See id.; Booth v. Booth, No. 0981-86-3, slip op. at 10-11 (Va. Ct. App. Feb. 2,
1988).
224. Conversely, when Illinois followed pure unitary property, transmutation occurred
only if the amount of commingling was significant. See, e.g., In re Morse, 143 Ill. App. 3d
849, 493 N.E.2d 1088 (1986). For mixed property cases adopting the same rule, see In Re
Herr, 705 S.W.2d 619 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); Templeton v. Templeton, 656 P.2d 250 (Okla.
1982). So far, the Virginia cases seem to be rejecting the Illinois approach.
225. No. 1092-88-4 (Va. Ct. App. Aug. 22, 1989).
226. Taylor v. Taylor, No. 1092-88-4, slip op. at 6 (Va. Ct. App. Aug. 22, 1989).
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the [separate property deposits]." Instead, the court seemed to compare the
amount of the commingled marital funds with the parties' total income at
the time and appeared to conclude that the "significant to the marital
relationship" test was met because most of the parties' income was placed
into the account.
It is hard to understand the court's logic in reaching this result. If two
husbands commingle exactly the same amounts of marital property and
separate property, the same result on the commingling question should be
reached in both cases even if one husband is poor and the other is a
millionaire. By suggesting that commingling depends not upon the amount
of property commingled, but upon the amount of property not commingled,
the court has interpreted the "significant to the marital relationship"
requirement in a strange way. Conversely, the court may have spoken
hastily, and because the court ultimately found that the "significant to the
marital relationship" test was met, its comments on when the test would
not be met are pure dicta. It is certainly possible that the court might adopt
a more logical position in subsequent cases and either abandon its signifi-
cance requirement completely 7 or at least compare the respective sizes of
the marital and separate interests commingled.
Finally, Lambert also left unclear what types of efforts are sufficient
to cause transmutation. Contributions of funds or services directly to the
property clearly would be sufficient. 228 Other states, however, have differed
on whether services as a homemaker can create active appreciation. Some
states have held that performance of homemaker services by one spouse
frees the other spouse to spend more time and effort on separate property
and, therefore, indirectly creates active appreciation. 229 Other states have
held that homemaker services are usual spousal duties that never create
active appreciation. 230 A sensible compromise between these two positions
might be that homemaker services create active appreciation only when one
spouse does more than his or her "fair share" of homemaker services. 23'
In implementing such a rule, it would be important to define "fair share"
in a sexually neutral manner to avoid discrimination against full-time
homemaker spouses.
23 2
227. The language in Lambert that transmutation can occur when the amount commingled
is "insubstantial" would suggest this. See Lambert, 367 S.E.2d at 190.
228. See id at 191; Booth v. Booth, No. 0981-86-3, slip op. at 9-11 (Va. Ct. App. Feb.
2, 1988).
229. See, e.g., Price v. Price, 69 N.Y.2d 8, 503 N.E.2d 684 (1986).
230. See, e.g., In re Herr, 705 S.W.2d 619 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
231. This middle approach has not been adopted by any state. In Price, 503 N.E.2d at
685-90, the New York court implied that even a small amount of homemaker services could
create active appreciation regardless of relative size. Thus, in New York, even a lazy housewife
who stays home all day and does only a small amount of the homemaker services apparently
benefits from active appreciation. By contrast, in Herr, 705 S.W.2d at 623, the court apparently
did not believe that homemaker services ever could create active appreciation, even if one
spouse did substantially all of the housework in order that the other spouse have time to
manage separate property. Neither of these two extremes is particularly attractive.
232. In particular, "fair share" should be defined without reference to whether a spouse
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b. Implied Gift
The second type of transmutation will be called transmutation by implied
gift. Under this theory, separate property becomes marital when the parties
jointly agree that it shall be marital property. In essence, the property
involved has been given jointly to the marital estate.
Only one Virginia case, Westbrook v. Westbrook,233 has considered
transmutation by implied gift. In Westbrook the parties jointly borrowed
money to build a home on the husband's pre-marital real estate. The wife
allowed use of her credit only after the husband agreed in writing that "we
own the house together."' 234 Upon divorce, the husband argued that the
property was separate, but the court found the written agreement sufficient
to transmute the home and lot into marital property.23s
Westbrook was an easy case to decide because there was clear written
evidence of an agreement to transmute. Such evidence rarely exists and
most implied gift cases rely on circumstantial evidence. The most common
type of circumstantial evidence is a transfer into joint tenancy, and under
Virginia law, such a transfer causes transmutation as a matter of law.236
Another common type of evidence is use of property for marital purposes.
One recent case, for example, found that the husband's separate property
car transmuted when the husband allowed the wife to use the car daly
during the marriage. 237 Conversely, separate property is not given implicitly
to the marital estate merely because it produces income that is used for
marital purposes.?8
IV. VALUATION
The second phase of equitable distribution requires courts to value the
parties' property. All property must be valued regardless of whether it is
marital or separate. 239 A court commits reversible error if it fails to value
is a full-time homemaker. Otherwise, two identical indirect contributions of homemaker services
to separate property may or may not cause transmutation depending upon whether the
contributing spouse was a homemaker. Such discrimination against homemaker spouses violates
the basic equitable distribution principle that direct financial contributions and indirect home-
maker contributions are roughly equal in value.
233. 5 Va. App. 446, 364 S.E.2d 523 (1988).
234. Westbrook v. Westbrook, 5 Va. App. 446, 364 S.E.2d 523, 526 (1988).
235. Westbrook, 364 S.E.2d at 528.
236. This is the net effect of VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(A)(2)(i) (Supp. 1989), which
defines all jointly titled assets as marital property.
237. Boyce v. Boyce, 694 S.W.2d 288 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985). A rule somewhat more
inclined toward transmutation was adopted in Coney v. Coney, 207 N.J. Super. 63, 503 A.2d
912, 918 (1985), which held that property transmutes when one spouse "represents to the other
that property will be shared."
238. Bizzell v. Bizzell, 697 S.W.2d 559 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); Brooks v. Brooks, 289 S.C.
352, 345 S.E.2d 510 (1986).
239. Hodges v. Hodges, 2 Va. App. 508, 347 S.E.2d 134 (1986). See VA. CODE ANN. §
20-107.3(A) (Supp. 1989) (requiring court to value "all property ... of the parties" before
considering which property is marital and which is separate).
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any asset capable of being valued on the evidence before the court.24
Trial courts in all equitable distribution states have great discretion in
valuing property. 241 The first rule of property valuation is that the trial
court can use any reasonable valuation method, and the court's decision
will be affirmed on appeal unless the decision constitutes an abuse of
discretion. 242 Nevertheless, Virginia courts have established several absolute
rules of law that govern valuation procedure. The burden of proof is clearly
upon the party seeking to classify an asset as marital, and a court should
ignore for equitable distribution purposes an asset that lacks sufficient
evidence to value?'
3
There has been some confusion in Virginia as to the date on which
property should be valued-the date of valuation.244 In Parra v. Parra24"
the court of appeal stated in dicta that trial courts were required to value
property as of the date on which the presumption of marital property
terminates. 246 This was a misreading of the statute, which at the time did
not even mention the date of valuation, and the court corrected the error
in Mitchell v. Mitchell.247 The Mitchell court held that because the General
Assembly had chosen no statutory valuation date, courts must decide the
date of valuation on a case-by-case basis. 24"
Fortunately, for Virginia trial judges, the Mitchell court did give some
guidance as to what date of valuation is likely to be most equitable. As a
general rule, the court said that the monetary award should be based upon
the most current financial information available. Accordingly, in most cases
the property should be valued as of the date of the evidentiary hearing.-
49
This is not an absolute rule, however, and the court indicated that an earlier
date would be more equitable in at least two different fact situations. First,
when one spouse dissipates marital assets after the date of separation, the
property should be classified and valued as of some date before the
dissipation. 250 Second, when an asset increases or decreases in value after
240. Bowers v. Bowers, 4 Va. App. 610, 359 S.E.2d 546 (1987).
241. See Price v. Price, 4 Va. App. 224, 355 S.E.2d 905 (1987).
242. See Price, 355 S.E.2d at 905 (1987); see generally L. GOLDEN, supra note 6, § 7.07.
243. Morris v. Morris, 3 Va. App. 303, 349 S.E.2d 661 (1986). See Green v. Green, 64
Md. 122, 494 A.2d 721 (1985); Hirschfeld v. Hirschfeld, 96 A.D.2d 473, 464 N.Y.S.2d 789
(1983).
244. The date of valuation should be distinguished from the date upon which the court
classifies property as marital or separate-the date of classification. The two dates may but
need not be the same. Mitchell v. Mitchell, 4 Va. App. 113, 355 S.E.2d 18, 20 (1987).
Questions involving the date of classification are discussed supra notes 116-26 and accompanying
text.
245. 1 Va. App. 118, 336 S.E.2d 157 (1985).
246. Parra v. Parra, 1 Va. App. 118, 336 S.E.2d 157, 162 (1985).
247. 4 Va. App. 113, 355 S.E.2d 18 (1987).
248. Mitchell v. Mitchell, 4 Va. App. 113, 355 S.E.2d 18, 21 (1987).
249. Mitchell, 355 S.E.2d at 21.
250. Id. See Berish v. Berish, 69 Ohio St. 2d 318, 432 N.E.2d 183 (1982) (husband
removed substantial sum from joint bank account after separation; account valued as of date
of separation; dissipated funds constructively awarded to husband).
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the separation as a result of one spouse's unassisted efforts, the property
also should be valued as of an earlier date to give the owning spouse the
benefit or burden of his labors.2 1
The legislature recently codified the Mitchell rule by requiring that
property be valued as of the evidentiary hearing unless the court orders
otherwise "for good cause shown, in order to attain the ends of justice."'
' 2
The order must be made pursuant to a motion entered no less than 21 days
before the evidentiary hearing.32
The discretionary review standard makes it very difficult to discover
and state rules of law on which valuation method is appropriate in any
given case. This article, therefore, does not review the substantive law of
valuation in any systematic manner. Instead, we will examine in some depth
one particular valuation problem: the valuing of a close corporation or
other small business. Because the general principles applied in the close
corporation setting are quite representative of the principles which apply
when valuing other assets, the following discussion should be helpful in
solving many different equitable distribution valuation problems.
The most significant part of a close corporation is its physical assets.
Failure to value these assets properly probably constitutes reversible error.
25 4
The assets should be valued in much the same way that assets are valued
in other cases: through the testimony of witnesses familiar with the assets
and the market for the assets. 2" Assets should be given a fair market value
and not the value at a dissolution or liquidation sale. 6 Expert testimony
is not required because the owner is always competent to testify as to the
value of his own propertyY 7 The testimony of a non-expert owner, however,
is not highly probative if opposed by other evidence.25
The owner's valuation, therefore, should be supported with expert
testimony. The expert will be most persuasive if he regularly values similar
251. Mitchell, 355 S.E.2d at 21. See In re Wagner, 208 Mont. 369, 679 P.2d 753 (1984)
(when parties separated, husband took ranch and wife took certain other property with which
she bought her own ranch; during separation, wife parlayed her share of property into thriving
and successful business while husband managed ranch so poorly that it declined in value;
valuation as of date of divorce reversed); Taylor v. Taylor, 436 N.E.2d 56 (Ind. 1982) (wife
paid all mortgage payments and other expenses on marital home after separation; home valued
at date of separation in order to give wife benefit of appreciation occurring after separation).
252. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3 (Supp. 1988).
253. Id.
254. Smith v. Smith, 709 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985); Weiss v. Weiss, 122 Wis.
2d 688, 365 N.W.2d 608 (1985).
255. See, e.g., Bohling v. Bohling, 683 S.W.2d 661 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
256. Kowalesky v. Kowalesky, 148 Mich. App. 151, 384 N.W.2d 112 (1986).
257. Bard v. Bard, 380 N.W.2d 342 (N.D. 1986); Berger v. Berger, 713 P.2d 695 (Utah
1985) (giving business no value in accordance with husband's testimony which was only
evidence on issue); Norman v. Norman, 604 S.W.2d 680 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
258. See In re Kaplan, 141 Ill. App. 3d 142, 490 N.E.2d 69 (1986) (trial court erred in
accepting husband's testimony which could not be reconciled with relevant financial data);
Bard v. Bard, 380 N.W.2d 342 (N.D. 1986) (rejecting unsupported testimony of husband and
wife and affirming trial court's valuation based upon law practice's gross receipts and net
income for past several years).
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businesses for non-litigation purposes. The court may be reluctant to rely
upon an otherwise qualified expert with little relevant prior experience.2 9
Conversely, it is unwise to rely too much upon experience. At least one
court has rejected testimony based solely upon "experience" and upon
"other businesses that I have dealt with" in the past. 26° The expert, instead,
should base his testimony upon a detailed review of the specific business.
26'
One should note, however, that the firm's value may be less than the
sum total of its assets. Failure to offset the firm's liabilities against its
assets is generally reversible error.262 Future liabilities should be considered
at present and not future value. 263 If the liabilities exceed the assets, then
the business has no value, 264 but it is error to offset any "negative value"
against the value of other marital assets. 265
There are several ways other than personal estimates by which the
parties can establish the assets and liabilities of a law practice. The firm's
balance sheet is certainly some evidence of the firm's worth. 26 Some states
even have held that the balance sheet is the "starting point" for a court's
inquiry, and these states allow deviations from the book value only if the
trial court affirmatively finds that the book value is inaccurate. 267
The courts also place weight upon arm's length dealings with third
parties, especially purchases and sales of the business being valued. 268 Even
transactions occurring after the valuation date may be admissible to the
259. See, e.g., Kowalesky v. Kowalesky, 148 Mich. App. 151, 384 N.W.2d 112 (1986)
(husband's expert was involved actively in valuation and sale of dental practices for commercial
purposes, while wife's expert was CPA with dentists as clients and who never had valued
dental practice before; trial court's acceptance of husband's valuation affirmed).
260. Bowen v. Bowen, 96 N.J. 36, 473 A.2d 73, 80 (1984).
261. See In re Bell, 220 Mont. 123, 713 P.2d 552 (1986) (affirming trial court's acceptance
of valuation testified to by husband and his expert appraiser).
262. Robison v. Robison, 100 Nev. 668, 691 P.2d 451 (1984); Clarkson v. Clarkson, 116
A.D.2d 824, 496 N.Y.S.2d 854 (1986). See Kowalesky v. Kowalesky, 148 Mich. App. 151, 384
N.W.2d 112 (1986). But see Wehner v. Wehner, 374 N.W.2d 569 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985)
(court may in its discretion give minimal or even no weight to debt when creditor is close
family member unlikely to enforce debt through legal action).
263. Clarkson v. Clarkson, 116 A.D.2d 824, 496 N.Y.S.2d 854 (1986).
264. Hodges v. Hodges, 2 Va. App. 508, 347 S.E.2d 134 (1986). Accord Green v. Green,
64 Md. App. 122, 494 A.2d 721 (1984); Wilbur v. Wilbur, 116 A.D.2d 953, 498 N.Y.S.2d
525 (1986).
265. Randolph v. Randolph, 67 Md. App. 577, 508 A.2d 996 (1986).
266. Bryan v. Bryan, 222 Neb. 180, 382 N.W.2d 603 (1986); Cronin v. Cronin, 372
N.W.2d 778 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985). See also Becker v. Becker, 218 Mont. 229, 707 P.2d 526
(1985) (affirming trial court's valuation of stock as corporation's net assets divided by its total
shares).
267. In re Kaplan, 141 Ill. App. 3d 142, 490 N.E.2d 69 (1986); Robison v. Robison, 100
Nev. 668, 691 P.2d 451 (1984).
268. See Hoffa v. Hoffa, 382 N.W.2d 522 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (buyout price accepted
as value); Cronin v. Cronin, 372 N.W.2d 778 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (relying in part on price
of recent redemption); Patton v. Patton, 78 N.C. App. 247, 337 S.E.2d 607 (1985) (relying in
part upon insurance proposal submitted by husband that contained an estimate of the
corporation's value), rev'd on other grounds, 318 N.C. 404, 348 S.E.2d 593 (1986).
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extent that the transaction reflects the value as of an earlier date.269 If the
firm's partnership agreement contains a formula for valuing the interest of
a partner who leaves the firm or dies, the formula is some evidence of the
corporation's value. 270 The formula is not controlling, however, because it
may have been created for purposes other than measuring accurately the
value of the business. 27' When more than one formula is contained in the
agreement, a court should use the formula most applicable to valuation
upon divorce.
272
The court also is allowed to consider the beneficial effects of owning a
large majority of the stock in a corporation and the detrimental effect of
owning only a small minority interest.273 The court may reduce the value
of the business if the owning spouse is a "key man" who might remain
with the business for an indefinite period of time.274 It also is necessary to
value the firm's accounts receivable. 275 Such accounts usually are taken at
face value less a reasonable percentage for bad debts.
2 76
In valuing close corporations, courts have not generally relied upon one
source. A possible exception is the Internal Revenue Service guidelines used
in valuing close corporations for tax purposes.277 Although distribution
based on these guidelines is not mandatory in any state, many different




269. See Litman v. Litman, 93 A.D.2d 695, 463 N.Y.S.2d 24 (1983), affd mem., 61
N.Y.2d 918, 474 N.Y.S.2d 718 (1984).
270. Bosserman v. Bosserman, No. 0500-88-3 (Va. Ct. App. Sept. 5, 1989). See Zipf v.
Zipf, 8 Va. App. 387, 382 S.E.2d 263 (1989). This rule is also common in other states. See
Stem v. Stem, 66 N.J. 340, 331 A.2d 257 (1975); Weaver v. Weaver, 72 N.C. App. 409, 324
S.E.2d 915 (1984).
271. Bosserman, slip op. at 7-8. See In re Marron, 170 Cal. App. 3d 151, 215 Cal. Rptr.
894 (1985); Bowen v. Bowen, 96 N.J. 36, 473 A.2d 73, 80 (1984) (rejecting formula that had
not been revised for several years).
272. Balogh v. Balogh, 356 N.W.2d 307 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984). But see Peddycord v.
Peddycord, 479 N.E.2d 615 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that voluntary withdrawal formula
controls death formula as matter of law).
273. See Novick v. Novick, 366 N.W.2d 330 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (control bonus);
Hartman v. Hartman, 82 N.C. App. 167, 346 S.E.2d 196 (1986) (approving 36% minority
discount); Eyler v. Eyler, 492 N.E.2d 1071 (Ind. 1986) (rejecting minority discount on facts
but conceding validity of concept); cf. Becker v. Becker, 218 Mont. 229, 707 P.2d 526 (1985)
(rejecting husband's argument that minority position made stock completely worthless).
274. Eyler v. Eyler, 492 N.E.2d 1071 (Ind. 1986); Hoffa v. Hoffa, 382 N.W.2d 522
(Minn. Ct. App. 1985); Nemitz v. Nemitz, 376 N.W.2d 243 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985); Rogers
v. Rogers, 296 N.W.2d 849 (Minn. 1980).
275. Smith v. Smith, 709 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985).
276. In re Bayer, 687 P.2d 537 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984); In re Anderson, 220 Mont. 477,
717 P.2d 11 (1986) (receivables due in less than year discounted by 25% to reflect likelihood
that debtor will miss payment). Other states have divided some unusually contingent receivables
on a percentage basis if and when received rather than dividing them on a lump sum basis at
the time of divorce. Weiss v. Weiss, 122 Wis. 2d 688, 365 N.W.2d 608 (1985).
277. Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237.
278. See, e.g., Kowalesky v. Kowalesky, 148 Mich. App. 151, 384 N.W.2d 112 (1986).
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The most difficult valuation issue involving close corporations is putting
a value on the corporation's goodwill. Valuation of goodwill is a factual
issue, and trial court valuations are generally not reversed unless there is a
manifest abuse of discretion.2 79 The burden of proof is on the party who
asserts that goodwill exists, and if there is insufficient evidence to value
goodwill, the court will ignore goodwill for equitable distribution purposes. 2 0
Conversely, if goodwill is marital property and the record does contain
sufficient evidence of its value, the trial court commits reversible error by
failing to value goodwill or plausibly explain the absence of a valuation. 28
Despite the clear abuse of discretion review standard, the reported
decisions have at least listed several acceptable methods that can be used
to evaluate goodwill. In Dugan v. Dugan282 the court discussed the excess
earnings method of computing goodwill. Under this method, goodwill is
the difference between the earnings of the business and the earnings of the
"average" or "reasonable" business, multiplied by some number (the
"multiplier") between one and five. 283 The "reasonable" attorney's salary
is the average salary for attorneys for comparable age and experience. The
court in Dugan hinted that when a northern New Jersey law practice is
involved, the trial court should limit the database to attorneys in New
Jersey or even northern New Jersey.284 It is clearly reversible error to base
the average salary upon a certain percentage of assets because salary and
physical assets are not necessarily related.285 The value of the multiplier
generally is established by expert testimony. There is a common value, and
the Dugan court indicated that "three is the factor regarded as least in need
of justification. 2 6 The excess earnings method has been accepted by other
courts both inside and outside New Jersey.287
279. See, e.g., Poore v. Poore, 75 N.C. App. 414, 331 S.E.2d 266 (1985).
280. Hirschfeld v. Hirschfeld, 96 A.D.2d 473, 464 N.Y.S.2d 789 (1983); In re Nordby,
41 Wash. App. 531, 705 P.2d 277 (1985).
281. Matsuo v. Matsuo, 124 A.D.2d 864, 508 N.Y.S.2d 630 (1986); Dorton v. Dorton,
77 N.C. App. 667, 336 S.E.2d 415 (1985).
282. 92 N.J. 423, 457 A.2d 1 (1983).
283. Dugan v. Dugan, 92 N.J. 423, 457 A.2d 1, 9-10 (1983). Other courts, instead of
multiplying by a factor, divide by a percentage (the "capitalization rate"). See, e.g., In re
Hull, 219 Mont. 480, 712 P.2d 1317 (1986). This difference is purely a matter of mathematical
preference and has no effect upon the final result.
284. Dugan, 457 A.2d at 11.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 11-12.
287. For cases accepting excess earnings, see Hunt v. Hunt, 698 P.2d 1168 (Alaska 1985)
(husband's expert valued goodwill at $132,760 under Dugan; wife's expert used IRS guidelines
to reach valuation of $766,000; court affirmed trial court acceptance of husband's figures,
finding excess earnings acceptable but not mandatory valuation method); In re White, 151 Ill.
App. 3d 778, 502 N.E.2d 1084 (1986) (affirming valuation based on excess earnings; experts
need not demonstrate personal familiarity with geographic area in which practitioner works);
In re Hull, 219 Mont. 480, 712 P.2d 1317 (1986) (valuing anesthesiology practice by excess
earnings). Only one case has held excess earnings to be an insufficient valuation method. See
In re Reiling, 66 Or. App. 284, 673 P.2d 1360 (1983) (wife's expert used Dugan method but
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Courts valuing goodwill also have relied upon estimations calculated by
expert witnesses without using any particular rigid mathematical method.
To be persuasive, these estimates must consider a number of relevant factors.
One court listed these factors as the practitioner's age, health, past earning
power, reputation, and professional success.2 18 The value is dependent upon
the value of the goodwill to the practitioner and not upon what a willing
buyer would pay in a fair exchange.2 9
The capitalization of earnings method generally has been rejected in the
equitable distribution context. Under the capitalization of earnings method,
goodwill is valued at some percentage of the present value of the future
income reasonably to be expected from the business. 290 This is a valid
method among economists for valuing goodwill, but courts considering the
method have been troubled by its use of future earnings. Because this
method defines goodwill as a portion of future earnings, many courts have
held that capitalization of earnings impermissibly confuses goodwill with
future earnings. Because income earned after the marriage is separate
property in every state, most states have rejected the capitalization of
earnings method. 29' Thus, it seems unlikely that a Virginia court would
approve the use of the capitalization of earnings method.
wife presented no evidence of husband's health, reputation, or work habits; held, insufficient
evidence to support award of goodwill), cert. denied, 296 Or. 536, 678 P.2d 738 (1984).
For tax purposes, the IRS follows a version of excess earnings that is somewhat different
from the method outlined in Dugan. See Rev. Rul. 68-609, 1968-2 C.B. 327. Under the IRS
method, the evaluator measures the tangible assets of the business and determines an average
rate of return on tangible assets for a business in the same situation as the business being
valued. Multiplying the tangible assets by the average rate of return yields the average earnings,
which are subtracted from the actual earnings to get the business' excess earnings. If the
business is a sole proprietorship, the owner's salary is subtracted further from the excess
earnings. The excess earnings then are multiplied by the "factor" discussed in the text to yield
the final value.
For additional cases accepting excess earnings as a valuation method but finding it to be
incorrectly applied to the case at hand, see In re Garrity/Bishton, 181 Cal. App. 3d 675, 226
Cal. Rptr. 485 (1986) (error to conclude that practice had no value because practitioner earned
less than average income; business is worth at least net total of tangible assets and receivables;
trial court essentially failed to realize that excess earnings is only a method for valuing goodwill
and not method for valuing entire practice); In re Kapusta, 141 Ill. App. 3d 1010, 491 N.E.2d
48 (1986) (court erred in using excess earnings method because there was no proof that
nationwide average income was average income in practitioner's area; court also erred by using
husband's income in usual 50 to 70 hour week because average income table was based on 40
hour week; court should have looked to husband's earnings per hour and not total earnings
per week); In re Hall, 103 Wash. 2d 236, 245, 692 P.2d .175, 180 (1984) (1985) (error to use
excess earnings blindly without taking into account surrounding circumstances; excess earnings
showed no goodwill, but husband recently had expanded his office and deliberately limited
hours of practice; notwithstanding excess earnings, "[c]onsideration of the appellant's repu-
tation, associations, referrals, location and trade name indicate the existence of goodwill");
cf. Levy v. Levy, 164 N.J. Super. 542, 397 A.2d 374 (Ch. Div. 1978) (holding that law practice
in only fair economic health has no excess earnings to begin with).
288. In re Nordby, 41 Wash. App. 531, 705 P.2d 277, 280 (1985).
289. In re Martin, 707 P.2d 1035 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985).
290. See, e.g., Hanson v. Hanson, 738 S.W.2d 429 (Mo. 1987).
291. See, e.g., E.E.C. v. E.J.C., 457 A.2d 688 (Del. 1983); In re Frazier, 125 Ill. App.
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V. MAKING THE MONETARY AwARD
Once the trial court has classified and valued the parties' property, it
must determine the amount of the monetary award. 29 The statute provides
remarkably little guidance as to how the award should be computed, stating
only that the award should be "[b]ased upon the equities and the rights
and interests of each party in the marital property''293 and that certain
specified factors should be considered. 294
Despite the statute's facial ambiguity, the Virginia decisions largely
agree on how the monetary award process operates. A court begins by
computing the amount of marital property to which each spouse equitably
is entitled. 2 5 The court then compares this amount with the marital property
actually in each spouse's possession, and based on this difference, the court
decides whether a monetary award is warranted. 296 Finally, if a monetary
award is warranted, the court then determines the amount of the award.
297
Thus, while Virginia courts cannot divide individually owned marital prop-
erty between the spouses, the monetary award process is very similar to the
distribution of property process in other states.
298
A. Statutory Factors
The statute lists eleven factors that the trial court must consider in
determining both the amount of the award and the method of payment.
299
While the statute does not rank the factors in any way, the first two factors
are in practice the most important.)° Under these factors, the trial court
must consider the monetary and non-monetary contributions made by each
3d 473, 466 N.E.2d 290 (1984); In re Weidemann, 402 N.W.2d 744 (Iowa 1987); Hanson v.
Hanson, 738 S.W.2d 429 (Mo. 1987); Rogers v. Rogers, 296 N.W.2d 849 (Minn. 1980); Jondahl
v. Jondahl, 344 N.W.2d 63 (N.D. 1984); cf. Robinson v. Robinson, 355 N.W.2d 737 (Minn.
Ct.App. 1984) (error to capitalize earnings for services performed but not error to capitalize
earnings based only upon ownership of property such as investment income, a questionable
distinction that most courts probably would reject). The same result also has been reached in
community property states on the basis that community property must be acquired during the
marriage. See In re Rives, 130 Cal. App. 3d 138, 181 Cal. Rptr. 572 (1982); In re Foster, 42
Cal. App. 3d 577, 117 Cal. Rptr. 49 (1974); In re Fortier, 34 Cal. App. 3d 384, 109 Cal.
Rptr. 915 (1973); In re Hall, 103 Wash. 2d 236, 692 P.2d 175 (1984).
292. See Brown v. Brown, 5 Va. App. 238, 361 S.E.2d 364 (1987) (eleven specific
distribution factors become relevant only after trial court has classified and valued parties'
property).
293. VA.CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(D) (Supp. 1989).
294. Id. § 20-107.3(E)(1-11).
295. Brinkley v. Brinkley, 5 Va. App. 132, 361 S.E.2d 139, 140 (1987).
296. Brinkley, 361 S.E.2d at 140.
297. Id at 140-41. Presumably, the monetary award should be equal to the difference
between the marital property a spouse actually possesses and the marital property to which he
or she is equitably entitled. No Virginia case, however, has expressly so stated.
298. See generally L. GOLDEN, supra note 6, §§ 8.03-.04 (describing division of property
and monetary award processes).
299. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(E)(1-11) (Supp. 1989).
300. See generally L. GOLDEN, supra note 6, § 8.18.
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spouse to "the well-being of the family" 30 and to the "acquisition and care
and maintenance" of the marital property.30 Together, these factors encom-
pass each party's entire contribution to the marriage.
As the statute indicates, neither monetary nor non-monetary contribu-
tions are more valuable than the other. The courts have noted several times
that intangible contributions to family welfare can be as valuable or even
more valuable than each party's tangible financial contributions.0 3 This
refusal to give direct monetary contributions undue weight is consistent with
the general equitable distribution policy that breadwinners and homemakers
make on the whole roughly equal contributions to the marital estate.
3 4
One area in which direct financial contributions do carry more weight
is in the division of transmuted property. The Virginia courts have empha-
sized at some length that when small marital contributions cause transmu-
tation, the court should consider an unequal division of the transmuted
property. 05 For instance, in Smoot v. Smoot,3°6 where a separate property
downpayment was made on a marital property home, the court returned
the amount of the downpayment to the husband before dividing the rest of
the home equally.
The remaining statutory factors are largely self-explanatory, and there
is little case law discussing them. The fifth factor requires a court to
consider conduct causing the dissolution of the marriage as one relevant
factor, but fault need not have a major effect or even any effect at all
upon the award if the equities of the case so require.307 The tenth factor
requires a court to consider the tax consequences of its actions, and while
the issue has not arisen in Virginia, other states have treated tax conse-
quences as relevant only when they are reasonably likely to occur.30 Un-
certain or speculative tax consequences have carried little or no weight in
other states.
3 9
301. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(E)(1) (Supp. 1989).
302. Id. § 20-107.3(E)(2). A similar point is made by the sixth factor, which requires the
court to consider when and how the marital property was acquired. Id. § 20-107.3(E)(6);
Brown v. Brown, 5 Va. App. 238, 361 S.E.2d 364 (1987).
303. See, e.g., Smoot v. Smoot, 233 Va. 435, 357 S.E.2d 728 (1987); Bentz v.Bentz, 2
Va. App. 486, 345 S.E.2d 773 (1986).
304. See generally L. GOLDEN, supra note 6, § 8.16 ("the desire to ensure that the
homemaker would be rewarded is probably the most important reason for equitable distribution
legislation"); id. §§ 8.16-.17.
305. See Smoot v. Smoot, 233 Va. 435, 357 S.E.2d 729 (1987); Lambert v. Lambert, 6
Va. App. 94, 367 S.E.2d 184 (1988).
306. 233 Va. 435, 357 S.E.2d 728 (1987). See also Pommerenke v. Pommerenke, 7 Va.
App. 241, 372 S.E.2d 630 (1988) (husband made $95,582 down payment on home with separate
funds, but home transmuted because $15,000 mortgage was paid with marital funds; affirming
trial court division awarding husband $102,500 from home and wife only $7500).
307. Smoot v. Smoot, 233 Va. 435, 357 S.E.2d 728, 732 (1987) (no automatic set reduction
in monetary award for fault; trial court properly gave no weight to fault where husband's
desertion was grounds for divorce, but his desertion was only symptom of marital breakdown
caused by both spouses).
308. See, e.g., Nolan v. Nolan, 107 A.D.2d 190, 486 N.Y.S.2d 415 (1985).
309. See, e.g., Rosenberg v. Rosenberg, 64 Md. App. 487, 497 A.2d 485 (1985); Wright
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Courts cannot consider the parties' spousal or child support obligations
as a factor in setting the award. Instead, courts should reconsider any pre-
existing support awards in light of the parties' post-award financial condi-
tions.31° In determining the monetary award, courts should limit its exami-
nation of the parties' finances to the period in which they were married. 3 1
Courts cannot consider the parties' future earning capacity in making the
award because this relates to future events that are more appropriately
considered in setting spousal support. 312
B. Making the Award
1. Monetary Awards Generally
Once a court determines the proper amount of the award, it should
order the proper party to pay the award. A monetary award is similar to
a money judgment; it is not a court order enforceable by contempt. 313 The
award may be either a lump sum payable immediately or an installment
obligation payable in fixed amounts at specific times. 31 4 Courts clearly lack
the authority to order conveyance of specific, individually-owned property,
and a decree making such an order is certain to be reversed. 315 A recent
amendment to the statute, however, permits courts to divide equitably any
property that is jointly titled. 3 6 Courts also may authorize a party to satisfy
v. Wright, 471 N.E.2d 1240 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984); cf. Olinger v. Olinger, 75 Or. App. 351,
707 P.2d 64 (1985) (in valuing property, error to subtract capital gains tax that would be due
upon sale because owner was unlikely to sell property); Bennett v. Bennett, 15 Mass. App.
Ct. 999, 448 N.E.2d 77 (1983) (trial court not required to consider tax consequences where
neither party introduced evidence as to what those consequences were).
310. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(F) (Supp. 1989); Williams v. Williams, 4 Va. App. 19,
354 S.E.2d 64 (1987).
311. Reid v. Reid, 7 Va. App. 553, 375 S.E.2d 533 (1989). This is quite an unusual rule
because most states affirmatively require the court to consider each party's earning capacity
and opportunity for future acquisition of property. See generally L. GOLDEN, supra note 6, §
8.20 (noting that "[i]n many states a primary goal of equitable distribution is to provide for
the future support needs of the parties"). Indeed, many states list earning capacity and
opportunity for further acquisition of assets as an equitable distribution factor. See, e.g., ILL.
STAT. ANN. ch. 40, para. 503(d)(10) (Supp. 1988). Interestingly, the Reid court did not seem
to realize this and described its holding as "axiomatic." Reid, 375 S.E.2d at 540. The court,
therefore, apparently was unaware that nationwide the general rule was contrary to its position.
312. Reid, 375 S.E.2d at 540.
313. Brown v. Brown, 5 Va. App. 238, 361 S.E.2d 364 (1987).
314. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(D) (Supp. 1989).
315. See, e.g., Lowe v. Lowe, 233 Va. 431, 357 S.E.2d 31 (1987); Price v. Price, 4 Va.
App. 224, 355 S.E.2d 905 (1987).
316. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(C) (Supp. 1989). In determining the monetary award,
courts must consider any legal title interest either spouse possesses in the marital property.
Thus, courts should include in the monetary award only that part of either spouse's interest
that exceeds the interest he or she already possesses.
In one recent decision, after determining that an equal division was appropriate, the trial
court included as part of the monetary award 50%1o of the value of an asset to which the wife
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part or all of the award by conveying title to property.1 7 The monetary
award can be payable only to the other spouse, and courts cannot transfer
property or funds to a third person. 18
2. Retirement Benefits
The Virginia statute contains a number of provisions specifically relevant
to division of pensions and retirement benefits. Courts are authorized to
direct payment of pension benefits directly to the non-owning spouse.
Presumably, such direction can be directed at either the owning spouse or
the pension plan itself.319 The amount of such payments cannot exceed fifty
percent of the pension's "marital share," which is defined as that part of
the pension earned during the marriage and before the final separation. 320
In Mitchell v. Mitchelpl the Virginia Court of Appeals held that the
above restrictions applied to all pension divisions regardless of whether the
court ordered direct payment or simply based the monetary award in part
upon the existence of the pension. In so holding, the court noted that the
statutory language referred to "any monetary award based upon the value
of pension or retirement benefits" and that the present value of a pension
was a statutory factor for the court to consider at the division stage.2 2 The
court rejected the position followed in most states that a court can award
the owning spouse the entire pension and award the other spouse offsetting
property or a monetary award.
32
In 1988 the legislature modified the statute that now refers to "direct
payment of a percentage of the marital share of any pension" and deleted
the present value of pension benefits from the list of division factors.
32
The 1988 amendments indirectly codify Mitchell. The new language clearly
provides that the pension limitations apply only when a court orders direct
payment of pension benefits from one spouse to the other. 32 The language
owned complete legal title. Ultimately, therefore, the wife received 150% of this asset-100%
legal title plus 50% as part of the monetary award. The court of appeals found this to be
error as a matter of law. See Kaufman v. Kaufman, 7 Va. App. 488, 375 S.E.2d 374 (1988).
The Kaufman trial court also awarded the wife 50% of the husband's interest in jointly titled
marital property. Id. In effect, therefore, the wife received 75% of the property (50% legal
interest plus 50% of the husband's 50% interest as monetary award). The court of appeals
also reversed this part of the trial court's decision, holding that the wife was entitled to only
her 50% legal interest. Id.
317. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(D) (Supp. 1989).
318. Woolley v. Woolley, 3 Va. App. 337, 349 S.E.2d 422 (1986).
319. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(G) (Supp. 1989).
320. Id.
321. 4 Va. App. 113, 355 S.E.2d 18 (1987).
322. Mitchell v. Mitchell, 4 Va. App. 113, 355 S.E.2d 18, 22 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. §
20-107.3(G) (repealed 1988) and § 20-107.3(E)(8) (repealed 1988)).
323. See generally L. GOLEN, supra note 6, § 6.16.
324. The 1988 amendments are codified primarily at VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(G) (Supp.
1989).
325. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(G) (Supp. 1989).
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relied upon in Mitchell that refers to any monetary award based upon a
pension is no longer in the statutes. Nevertheless, the legislature also deleted
the statutory provision that allows a court to consider the present value of
a pension in setting the monetary award, and in light of this express
deletion, it seems unlikely that present value can be considered under the
catch-all factor. 326 Thus, a court cannot currently consider pension benefits
in setting the monetary award. The only way to compensate the non-owning
spouse for such benefits is by a direct payment order. Because pensions
now can be divided only by direct payment, the statutory pension restrictions
apply in all cases just as the Mitchell court held.
3. The "One Monetary Award Rule"
The most confusing issue involving the actual making of the award is
the "one monetary award rule." The rule, which is relevant mainly to
division of retirement benefits, was first stated in Brinkley v. Brinkley.327
In Brinkley the trial court gave the wife a $3000 monetary award and
ordered the husband to pay the wife thirty-six percent of his future monthly
pension payments. 328 The Virginia Court of Appeals reversed this decision
and held:
As we read [the trial court's decision], it effectively grants to the
wife two monetary awards. However, Code § 20-107.3 . . .contem-
plates only one monetary award, the amount of which is determined
by the careful consideration of the eleven criteria enumerated in
subsection (E). Although Code § 20-107.3(G) as it read prior to its
amendment required the trial court to identify that portion of the
award based upon retirement benefits ... that portion cannot be
construed as authorizing multiple monetary awards.
329
Thus, the court held that by awarding both a set monetary sum and a
percentage of the pension, the trial court impermissibly had made two
monetary awards. The case was remanded back to the trial court with the
following instructions:
Once the amount of the monetary award has been determined
by careful consideration of all of the Code § 20-107.3(E) factors,
including the present value of percentage of those benefits toward
satisfaction of the award .... If the court directs payment of a
percentage of the pension, profit-sharing, or retirement benefits in
satisfaction of the monetary award, such payments can be required
"only as such benefits are payable." 30
326. Id. § 20-107.3(E)(11).
327. 5 Va. App. 132, 361 S.E.2d 139 (1987).
328. Brinkley v. Brinkley, 5 Va. App. 132, 361 S.E.2d 139, 142 (1987).
329. Brinkley, 361 S.E.2d at 142.
330. Id. (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(G) (Supp. 1989)) (emphasis added).
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The trial court, therefore, must determine a single monetary award without
reference to the manner in which it will be paid. After the award has been
established, the trial court then may order a specific portion of that award
to be satisfied by payment of a specific portion of each pension payment.
Brinkley can be interpreted in a number of different ways. Because the
trial court in Brinkley gave little explanation as to how it arrived at any
part of its award, the court of appeals' action was on one level a simple
reminder to the trial courts that they must consider all the parties' marital
property before arriving at a monetary award. Each spouse's interest in the
other spouse's pension must be determined after consideration of all the
facts in the case and not merely all the facts relating to the pension itself.
In its instructions upon remand, the court properly emphasized that the
monetary award is a single sum based on all of the statutory factors and
not a series of smaller sums based on facts surrounding individual assets.
At another level, however, Brinkley can be interpreted as requiring that
pension awards be certain in amount. Because the court specifically required
that a pension award satisfy a specifically stated amount of the overall
monetary award, some trial courts have held that Virginia law requires all
pension awards to be limited to a specific dollar amount. In other words,
Brinkley can be interpreted as holding that it is error to award a flat
percentage of all future pension payments. Instead, the court must award
a certain definite dollar amount that is satisfied by paying a specified
percentage of all pension payments until the definite dollar amount has
been reached.
This potential reading of Brinkley was rejected in Zipf v. Zipf.33 ' The
trial court in Zipf awarded the wife twenty-five percent of the husband's
pension, payable at a specified rate until the total payments equalled twenty-
five percent of the pension's present value at the time of divorce. The court
of appeals reversed, noting that present value is an accurate method of
pension valuation only if the non-owning spouse receives that value at the
time of divorce. If the receipt of that value is deferred until after the
divorce, however, it is wrong to measure the value as of the time of divorce.
Instead, the value should be determined as of the time when the value is
actually received. The Zipf court, therefore, gave the trial court two options
on remand: it could either abandon altogether the monetary cap on the
total payments the wife would receive332 or increase the monetary cap to
reflect "certain amounts necessary to compensate the spouse for the addi-
tional discounting that results. ' 333 Because the trial court was given the
331. 8 Va. App. 387, 382 S.E.2d 263 (1989).
332. In other words, the court on remand could award the wife 25% of the husband's
pension for life, placing no limit upon the sum total of all payments that the wife could
receive.
333. Zipf v. Zipf, 8 Va. App. 387, 382 S.E.2d 263, 269. Modifying the cap in accordance
with the second alternative is a mathematically difficult process that probably would require
expert testimony. The easiest modification would be simply to increase the cap at a reasonable
interest rate. Cf. Cross v. Cross, 363 S.E.2d 449 (W. Va. 1987). But the court of appeals
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option to dispense with the cap completely, any reading of Brinkley that
would prevent the option is probably no longer valid.
The 1988 amendments to the statute limit the one monetary award rule
to pending cases only. Section 20-107.3(G) now provides that the court may
make a pension award "in addition to the monetary award made pursuant
to subsection D, and upon consideration of the factors set forth in subsection
E."' 334 Thus, the General Assembly has affirmed the first reading of Brinkley
discussed above. Trial courts must consider all of the statutory factors
relating to all of the parties' property before dividing a pension, but nothing
prohibits courts from awarding an unlimited percentage of all future pension
payments.
C. Partition
Under the 1988 amendments, a court is allowed to divide jointly owned
property equitably between the spouses. 35 Marital property is presumed to
be jointly owned unless "there is a deed, title, or other clear indicia that it
is not jointly owned.
'336
Before 1988, however, a court could divide jointly owned property only
by partitioning the property.3 7 Partition in marital actions was governed by
the same statutes applying to partition proceedings generally. 38 Under the
partition statutes, a court was required to divide the property between the
spouses if such a partition could be made conveniently.33 9 If a partition
could not be made conveniently and the interest of the parties would be
promoted by an alternate means of division, a court could allow one spouse
to purchase the other's interest,314 order the property sold, and divide the
proceeds, 34' or use any combination of these methods.3 42 Regardless of which
method is used, each spouse had to be compensated fairly for his or her
legal title interest.3 4
3
already has held that interest cannot be awarded on a deferred pension award. McLaughlin v.
McLaughlin, 2 Va. App. 463, 346 S.E.2d 535 (1986). Because dispensing with the cap is a
much simpler alternative than modifying it, the author expects that Zipf, as a practical manner,
will cause trial judges to stop placing absolute dollar limits on pension awards.
334. VA. CODE ANN. § 20.107.3(G) (Supp. 1989).
335. Id. § 20-107.3(C).
336. Id. § 20-107.3(A)(2).
337. Id. § 20-107.3(C) (repealed 1988). See, e.g., Clayberg v. Clayberg, 4 Va. App. 218,
355 S.E.2d 902 (1987); see also Morris v. Morris, 3 Va. App. 303, 349 S.E.2d 661 (1986)
(excellent general discussion of how partition principles operate in the equitable distribution
setting).
338. Morris, 349 S.E.2d at 661. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-81-.01-93 (1984).
339. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-.83 (1984). See, e.g., Cauthorn v. Cauthorn, 196 Va. 614,
85 S.E.2d 256 (1955).
340. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01.83 (1984). See Sensabaugh v. Sensabaugh, 232 Va. 250, 349
S.E.2d 141 (1986); Johnson v. Merrit, 125 Va. 162, 99 S.E. 785 (1919).
341. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-83 (1984). See Peatross v. Gray, 181 Va. 847, 27 S.E.2d 203
(1943).
342. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-83 (1984).
343. Morris v. Morris, 3 Va. App. 303, 349 S.E.2d 661 (1986).
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VI. THE FIRsT FIVE YEARS: AN EVALUATION
The Virginia courts now have had five years to interpret the Virginia
equitable distribution statute and have responded by establishing a coherent
and consistent equitable distribution doctrine. Coherence and consistency
alone, however, are not enough. Even the worst law would appear wise if
measured only against itself. The Virginia statute is based upon similar
statutes in many other states, and its enactment was part of a general
nationwide movement toward a fairer division of property upon divorce.
By comparing Virginia's experience with the experience of other states with
similar statutes, we can better understand where Virginia's law is strong
and where it might be improved.
The most salient feature of Virginia's equitable distribution law is the
Virginia Supreme Court's adoption of unitary property.344 Whether property
can be part marital and part separate is a fundamental equitable distribution
question, and the Supreme Court's answer to that question has laid the
entire conceptual basis for Virginia's equitable distribution law. Indeed, in
hindsight, it is amazing that such a fundamental question was left unan-
swered by the General Assembly when it enacted the statute. Because the
nature of marital property is such a basic equitable distribution question,
the choice between unitary and mixed property is an ideal subject for
legislative action.
Nevertheless, the General Assembly did not specify the nature of marital
property and left the question to the Virginia Supreme Court. Because the
Supreme Court adopted an answer that has been rejected in almost every
other state,3 4 it is easy to cast a discussion of Smoot in terms of whether
the court reached the "right" or "wrong" result. Such a discussion serves
little purpose other than demonstrating the ideological preferences of the
author. A better way of evaluating Smoot in particular and unitary property
in general is to determine how the ultimate result reached under Smoot
differs from the result that a mixed property state might reach under similar
facts. Fortunately, the leading North Carolina case adopting mixed property,
Wade v. Wade,3" was decided under facts very similar to the facts on which
the Smoot court adopted unitary property. A comparison of the ultimate
result reached in the two cases yields useful insights into both Virginia and
North Carolina law.
For simplicity and consistency, we will use a hypothetical fact situation
based on Smoot and Wade rather than the actual facts of either case.
Assume that the husband makes a down payment on a home before the
parties are married. Mortgage payments are made on the property during
the marriage, and before the mortgage is paid off, the parties are divorced.
In Virginia the home would be entirely marital property although it might
344. See Smoot v. Smoot, 233 Va. 435, 357 S.E.2d 728 (1987).
345. See, e.g., L. GOLDEN, supra note 6, § 5.06A (Supp. 1987).
346. 72 N.C. App. 372, 325 S.E.2d 260, cert. denied, 313 N.C. 612, 330 S.E.2d 616
(1985).
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be divided unequally. In North Carolina, by contrast, the home would be
part marital and part separate property. The separate portion would be a
percentage equal to the total mortgage payments made with separate funds
divided by the total mortgage payments made with all funds plus the separate
property down payment, and it would be awarded entirely to the husband.
The marital portion of the home would be divided equitably, and absent
any strong reason to the contrary, it would be divided equally.
The basic difference between the two results is the degree of protection
afforded to separate property. In North Carolina, if separate and marital
funds are mixed, a proportional amount of the mixture will remain separate
property. As a matter of law, a trial judge will be required to measure the
separate portion and return it to the husband. 347 In Virginia, by contrast,
the entire mixture will be marital property, and the ultimate division will
be left to the trial court's discretion.3 48 Although the Smoot court affirmed
the trial court's decision to award the husband the amount of his down-
payment "off the top," the court noted that this result was not required
as a matter of law. 349 The trial court probably would have been affirmed
if it had used the same fractional approach used in North Carolina or if it
had divided the property equally without giving the husband any special
preference at all.
This uncertainty of result is a basic feature of unitary property. Under
unitary property, when all commingled property is marital, the trial court
has more flexibility to insure equity based on the facts of the case, but
there is also no assurance that a spouse owning commingled separate
property will receive any specific part of that property when the parties are
divorced. Under mixed property, by contrast, the owner of commingled
separate property receives a certain mandatory property award because his
commingled property remains separate. Mixed property, therefore, gives the
trial court less flexibility, but it makes the result much more predictable.
The Wade court chose predictability over flexibility; the Smoot court made
exactly the opposite choice.
The tradeoff between predictability and flexibility also is present in
other contexts. For instance, both Virginia and North Carolina have "dual
classification" equitable distribution statutes that allow a trial court to
divide only certain "marital" property.350 A minority of other states, how-
ever, allow trial courts to divide all property owned by the parties, thus
giving the trial court even more flexibility than Virginia at the cost of even
more uncertainty.3 51 By contrast, before section 20-107.3 was enacted, prop-
347. Wade v. Wade, 72 N.C. App. 372, 389, 325 S.E.2d 260, 268-69, cert. denied, 313
N.C. 612, 330 S.E.2d 616 (1985).
348. Smoot, 357 S.E.2d at 730-31.
349. Id. at 731-32.
350. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20 (1987); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3 (Supp. 1989).
351. For example, Massachusetts' equitable distribution statute, stripped of excess verbiage,
provides simply that "the court may assign to either husband or wife all or any part of the
estate of the other." MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 34 (1987).
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erty division in Virginia was purely a matter of legal title, and the title
theory yielded results that were certain but highly inflexible. In a national
and historical context, therefore, Virginia has opted for a middle position
between flexibility and certainty. Unitary property is more flexible than
either mixed property or pure legal title, but more certain than the "all
property" system.
Because Smoot's balance between certainty and flexibility is within the
mainstream of court decisions nationwide, there is no reason to suspect that
unitary property is either too uncertain or too inflexible. Nevertheless, most
of the courts and commentators that have addressed this question in recent
years have opted for a more certain, less flexible result.
Of special importance to Virginia is Illinois' brief experiment with the
unitary theory of property. Illinois adopted unitary property in 1981,352 and
the courts followed that theory enthusiastically for several years. The
legislature became displeased, however, and in 1984 the Illinois legislature
created a statutory right to reimbursement . 53 The statute is complicated and
not fully understood even by the Illinois courts, but the statute essentially
provides that the owner of transmuted property has a right of reimbursement
equal to the amount of separate property that transmuted. Thus, while the
statute does not directly overturn unitary property, the net effect of the
statute is to make Illinois a mixed property state.
The Illinois reimbursement statute has been described by the Illinois
courts as a legislative rejection of unitary property principles. 354 The legis-
lature apparently was concerned that too much separate property was
transmuting into marital property and that Illinois courts were not dividing
transmuted property unequally in favor of the spouse whose separate
property transmuted. Because many spouses were not being compensated at
either the classification or the division stage for their separate property
rights, the very concept of separate property was endangered by unitary
property principles. Because in Virginia exactly the same arguments can be
made with respect to unitary property, it is certainly possible that the
General Assembly might join the Illinois legislature in rejecting unitary
property.
There is almost no statistical evidence that bears upon the relative
fairness of competing equitable distribution theories. Several recent studies,
however, have suggested that women receive on the average between thirty-
five and forty percent of the marital estate.355 This figure suggests that
352. See In re Smith, 86 Ill. 2d 518, 427 N.E.2d 1239 (1981).
353. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 503(c) (Supp. 1987).
354. See In re Brown, 127 Ill. App. 3d 831, 469 N.E.2d 612 (1984).
355. See New Jersey Supreme Court Task Force on Women in the Courts, Summary
Report, quoted in L. WEriZAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTIoN at 106 (1985) (finding "unofficial
standard" in New Jersey that "the wife will receive no more than 35% to 40% of the net
marital assets"); Cohen & Hillman, Analysis of Seventy Select Decisions After Trial Under
New York State's Equitable Distribution Law (unpublished manuscript 1984), quoted in L.
WErrZMAN, supra, at 106-07 (concluding after study of reported New York cases that women
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notwithstanding general equitable distribution principles, trial judges are in
fact favoring men when dividing marital property. If this is true, then the
logical remedy is to restrict the trial judge's discretion and make the property
division process more certain. In particular, other states have expressed this
need for certainty by rejecting unitary property3 6 and by presuming that
an equal division is equitable unless one spouse proves otherwise.35 7 If the
General Assembly desires to make Virginia's statute more predictable and
less discretionary, either of these changes would help accomplish that
purpose.
Therefore, there is room for improvement in Virginia's equitable dis-
tribution law. Virginia's problems, however, pale in comparison to the very
real accomplishments made in the past five years. Virginia's courts and the
General Assembly have developed a consistent and workable equitable
distribution theory that strikes a reasonable balance between consistency
and flexibility. While the current system is heavily dependent upon the
competence and discretion of local trial judges, Virginia's equitable distri-
bution system fairly compensates both spouses for contributions to the
marital partnership. If Virginia's trial judges rise to the occasion by making
consistent and wise decisions, Virginia could become a model for other
equitable distribution states to follow.
received less than 50% of marital property). A more recent study of divorce cases in New
Haven, Connecticut found that women received on the average 68% of the net marital assets.
J. McLindon, Separate But Unequal: The Economic Disaster of Divorce for Women and
Children, 21 Fam. L.Q. 351, 381 (1987). Connecticut divides all property owned by either
spouse upon divorce and has done so for many years. Thus, the New Jersey and New York
studies seem more relevant to Virginia than the Connecticut study.
356. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 503(c) (Supp. 1987).
357. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(c) (1987).
